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Sentence for the Damned: Using Atkins
to Understand the “Irreparable
Corruption” Standard for Juvenile Life
Without Parole
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The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who
never make up their minds to be good or evil.1
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I. Introduction
In 1924, two teenagers, Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb,
stood trial in Chicago for the “crime of the century.”2 The two boys
were accused of randomly selecting, kidnapping, and brutally
murdering a neighborhood boy, fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks, as
he walked home from school and then leaving his naked body in a
culvert.3 Both boys confessed to the murder and displayed no
remorse.4 Asked their motive, the boys replied that it was “an
experiment in sensation.”5
Facing the death penalty, the boys, represented by famous
“attorney for the damned” Clarence Darrow,6 pleaded guilty to avoid
the judgment of a jury.7 This put the decision as to whether they
should live or die in the hands of the judge.8 Such a sentencing
hearing would be otherwise unremarkable except for two important
2. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme
Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 702–04 (2002) (providing a synopsis of the crime).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 702 n.245.
6. For more information on Darrow, see JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE
DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (2011); ANDREW E. KERSTEN, CLARENCE
DARROW: AMERICAN ICONOCLAST (2011).
7. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 702.
8. Id.
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things weighing on the judge’s decision: (1) who these boys were and
(2) a bevy of psychological testimony put on by the defense to
persuade the judge to let the two boys live.9
Leopold and Loeb were the sons of Hyde Park millionaires and,
though still teenagers, graduates of elite universities.10 At the time
of the murder, Leopold was already a published ornithographer and
had qualified to enter Harvard Law School.11 Loeb was the youngest
ever graduate of the University of Michigan.12 In their defense,
Darrow put on psychiatrists and experts on juvenile delinquency to
explain the boys’ behavior.13 In his final plea, Darrow invoked the
change in attitudes towards juvenile offenders that saw Chicago at
the center of a movement to treat—instead of punish—child
offenders.14 Darrow warned that sentencing these teenagers to
death would be “turning our faces backward toward the barbarism
which once possessed the world” and prophesized, in summation,
that
Someday, if there is any such thing as progress in the world, if
there is any spirit of humanity that is working in the hearts of
men, someday men would look back upon this as a barbarous age
which deliberately set itself in the way of progress, humanity,
and sympathy, and committed an unforgivable act.15

Leopold and Loeb were spared and sentenced to life in
prison.16 While in prison, Leopold and Loeb founded and ran the

9. See id. at 703 (noting the degree to which the testimony of these “men of
science” attracted international attention to the case and an invitation to
Sigmund Freud to psychoanalyze the defendants).
10. See Paula S. Fass, Making and Remaking an Event: The Leopold and
Loeb Case in American Culture, 80 J. AM. HIST. 919, 922 (1993) (profiling the
defendants).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 703.
14. See MAUREEN MCKERNAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL OF LEOPOLD
AND LOEB 186 – 87 (1957) (“You would be dealing a staggering blow to all that has
been done in the city of Chicago in the last twenty years for the protection of
infancy and childhood and youth.”); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the
juvenile reform movement of the early twentieth century and its origins in
Chicago).
15. MCKERNAN, supra note 14, at 231.
16. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 704.
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Statesville Correspondence School for prisoners.17 Leopold learned
twelve languages, reclassified the prison library, became an x-ray
technician, registered inmates for the draft during World War II,
volunteered for a medical project to cure malaria, and wrote an
autobiography.18 After thirty-three years, he was paroled, married,
worked in a hospital, taught at the University of Puerto Rico,
researched leprosy, and upon his death willed his body to science.19
Eighty years after the sensationalized case of the
“boy-murderers,” the United States Supreme Court held in Roper
v. Simmons20 that courts could not sentence juveniles to death.21
Darrow’s prophecy came true as a result of developments in brain
science, which enabled the Supreme Court to conclude that the
developing adolescent brain may result in an individual’s
diminished personal culpability for crimes he commits.22 This
diminished culpability required the Court to reassess the
proportionality of some criminal sanctions when imposed upon
children and the intellectually disabled.23
Alongside these developments, however, two new phenomena
emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century, which called
into question whether this moment could truly be called progress.
There was both a shift towards longer and more severe
punishments in criminal sentencing at large and a concomitant
hardening in attitudes towards juvenile justice—from a focus on
rehabilitation of youthful offenders to a focus on punishment.24
Life without parole went from being an unused, or misnamed,25
17. Id. Richard Loeb was murdered in prison in 1936, twelve years into his
sentence. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 704–05.
20. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
21. See id. at 568 (holding that the imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders under eighteen constituted “cruel and unusual punishment”
barred by the Eighth Amendment).
22. See infra Part II.C (discussing the brain science developments of the late
twentieth century).
23. See infra Part III.A – B (discussing the development of the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence into the realm of juvenile culpability).
24. Infra Part II.A– B.
25. See infra Part II. A (discussing how parole eligibility made life sentences
“life” in name only).
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punishment to being on the books in every state but Alaska.26 And,
in response to the appearance of a juvenile crime wave, more and
more teenagers were being sentenced to die in prison.27
With these forces at play, the Supreme Court intervened in
Miller v. Alabama,28 holding that the Eighth Amendment’s
protection of juveniles due to their diminished culpability not only
barred states from sentencing juveniles to death but also from
sentencing juveniles to life without parole without considering the
mitigating circumstances of youth.29 In doing so, the Court stopped
shy of announcing an all-out constitutional protection for juveniles,
instead distinguishing between those whose crime “reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”30 Those
juvenile offenders meeting this irreparable corruption standard
could still be sentenced to the harshest available penalty—life
without parole.31
But what does irreparable corruption mean? And how are
state courts to determine whether an offender, still an adolescent,
meets this standard of irreparable corruption? Would Nathan
Leopold have been considered irreparably corrupt when assessed
at the time, in spite of what we know about his life after he was

26. See infra Part II.A (reviewing the expansion of life without parole as a
sentencing option following the moratorium on the death penalty in the early
1970s).
27. See infra Part II.B (discussing the superpredator theory and the
explosion of juvenile life without parole sentences).
28. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
29. See id. at 479 (forbidding a mandatory sentencing scheme, which by its
nature makes the youth of the offender “irrelevant to imposition of that harshest
prison sentence”).
30. Id. at 479– 80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
31. See id. at 480 (“[W]e do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that
judgment in homicide cases.”); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718,
734 (2016) (clarifying that Miller did more than simply require consideration of a
juvenile offender’s youth, it “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional
penalty for a class of defendants,” those who were not irreparably corrupt).
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paroled?32 Because of federalism concerns, the Supreme Court has
largely left these questions to the states to determine.33
This Note suggests that guidance should be drawn from the
Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence regarding the
execution of intellectually disabled offenders. Atkins v. Virginia34
paved the way for the juvenile sentencing cases as the Supreme
Court for the first time found that, under the Eighth Amendment,
a selected class of offenders—the intellectually disabled—were not
eligible for the state’s harshest penalty—the death penalty—
because of their diminished culpability.35 Atkins similarly left the
state courts to figure out how to decide whether an individual
offender met this amorphous standard, “intellectually disabled.”36
As state courts grappled with this standard and failed to
adequately define “intellectually disabled,” the Supreme Court
was forced to provide guidance.37 That guidance, in essence, was to
follow the science to determine who was intellectually disabled.38
State courts should do the same in developing procedures for
32. Leopold was nineteen and, therefore, he would not have been affected by
the rulings in Miller or Montgomery, but, because adolescent brain research now
shows that brain development continues into a person’s twenties, Leopold can still
serve as an example. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 702 (providing
Leopold’s age); BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES
ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS 204 (2003) (describing
adolescent brain development extending past the teenage years).
33. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (explaining how the Court’s concerns
for federalism limits the degree to which it will impose procedural requirements
on the states in determining how to carry out the sovereign administration of
their criminal justice systems).
34. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
35. See id. at 321 (concluding that death is not a suitable punishment for an
intellectually disabled offender because it would not serve the deterrent or
retributive purposes of the death penalty).
36. Id. at 317.
37. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (rejecting Florida’s
procedure for determining if an individual is intellectually disabled); Moore v.
Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017) (rejecting Texas’s procedure).
38. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 721 (“The legal determination of intellectual
disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical
community’s diagnostic framework. Atkins itself points to the diagnostic criteria
employed by psychiatric professionals.”); Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (“As we
instructed in Hall, adjudications of intellectual disability should be ‘informed by
the views of medical experts.’ That instruction cannot sensibly be read to give
courts leave to diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.”)
(citations omitted).
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determining who is irreparably corrupt, even if the result is a de
facto prohibition on sentencing any juvenile offenders to life
without parole.
In Part II, this Note will look at the confluence of factors that
led the Supreme Court to expand its Eighth Amendment scrutiny
to encompass juvenile life without parole sentences.
Part III will look at the development of the irreparable
corruption standard by tracing the line of cases from Roper to
Montgomery, in which the Supreme Court articulated how the new
scientific understanding of adolescent development affected what
penalties states could and could not impose upon juvenile offenders
under the Eighth Amendment. Part III will then look to the
difficulties that have arisen in trying to interpret the irreparable
corruption standard.
Part IV will make the case for why the courts struggling with
this standard should look to the Atkins cases for guidance. Part V
will then address the substantive guidance the Court gave in
Atkins and how a decade later in Hall and Miller the Supreme
Court was compelled to step in to correct Florida and Texas’s
misapplication of the Atkins standard. Part V then argues that
state courts should apply the guidance from these Atkins
cases—namely that the states needed to hue closer to the clinical
guidance in making these determinations—in interpreting the
irreparable corruption standard.
Overall, this Note argues that to ensure the state court
definitions of irreparable corruption do not become untethered
from their clinical foundation, Montgomery should be read to
require expert testimony that a juvenile offender is irreparably
corrupt and among the rare offenders for whom life without parole
is constitutionally permissible. Courts should require such
testimony to make a determination, even if presently such
testimony is not possible to find.
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II. Background of the Issues Surrounding Criminal Culpability
and Juveniles
Beginning with Roper v. Simmons39 in 2005, the Supreme
Court recognized a constitutional difference between adult and
juvenile offenders based on juveniles’ diminished culpability.40
Roper and the line of cases that followed41 reflected a Court
grappling with how to apply evidence of scientific developments
into its jurisprudence.42 These cases also highlighted a Court
grappling with the effects of sentencing schemes designed to keep
people in jail for longer and from an earlier age.43
A. Life Without Parole
While legal scholars tend to focus on the death penalty as the
distinguishing feature of the American criminal justice system,44
at least one scholar has argued that another punishment—life
without parole—presents the most striking distinction.45 In
39. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
40. See id. at 571 (prohibiting the death penalty for juvenile offenders due in
part to their diminished culpability).
41. See infra Part III.B (discussing the progression of juvenile culpability
cases leading to the “irreparable corruption” standard).
42. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (discussing the scientific studies that suggest
juveniles have “a lack of maturity” and an “underdeveloped sense of
responsibility”); Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain
Development Inform Public Policy?, 50 CT. REV. 70, 75 (2014) (noting the
dissenting judges preferred a case-by-case approach to assessing psychological
maturity).
43. See Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal
Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 989 (2014) (suggesting the Miller
cases reaffirmed the principle, dormant during the extreme sentencing trend of
the 1980s and 90s, that the law treat children different because they act
different).
44. See, e.g., Moshik Temkin, The Great Divergence: The Death Penalty in
the United States and the Failure of Abolition in Transatlantic Perspective 1–2
(Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP15-037, 2015) (detailing the
“striking divide” between the American criminal justice system and that in
Europe based on use of the death penalty).
45. See Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted Punishment, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2013) (suggesting that the American use of life
without parole sentences is the “most striking evidence” of the divide between
“European leniency” and “American harshness”).
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Europe, only four nations even have criminal sanctions
approximating life without parole46 and the sentence is rarely
applied.47 In the United States, both the number of states using
life without parole as a criminal sanction and the number of
inmates serving life without parole sentences increased
dramatically during the latter half of the twentieth century.48
In the early part of the twentieth century, very few American
jurisdictions imposed life without parole49 and those that did, did
so only as a replacement for the death penalty.50 Wisconsin, a state
that replaced the death penalty with life without parole, issued an
official report, which portrayed the “indescribable horror and
agony incident to imprisonment for life” and recommended the use
of fixed term sentences, which, though long, would “leave some
faint glimmer of hope.”51
For the most part, those handed a “life” sentence were
parole-eligible after a relatively short period.52 During the first half
of the twentieth century, federal prisoners sentenced to life would
be parole-eligible after fifteen years.53 In 1976, Congress changed
46. See id. at 1113 (noting that the Netherlands, England and Wales, and
France have inmates serving life sentences where the only mechanism for relief
is executive clemency).
47. See id. (calculating that there are fewer than one hundred inmates
serving the equivalent of a life without parole sentence in Europe).
48. See Leslie Patrice Wallace, And I Don’t Know Why It is That You Threw
Your Life Away: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 39–44 (2010) (detailing and explaining the rise of life without
parole).
49. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH
PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 95 (2017) (counting only seven states with
life without parole before 1972).
50. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1115 (explaining that a century ago, life
without parole was imposed primarily as an alternative to the death penalty).
51. See id. (citing a report found in WILLIAM TALLACK, PENOLOGICAL AND
PREVENTIVE PRINCIPLES 155 (1889)).
52. Id.; see also ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON:
THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 3 (2013) (highlighting
Louisiana’s “10/6 law,” in place from 1926 to the 1970s, that allowed life sentenced
prisoners to be released after a little over a decade if they demonstrated good
behavior).
53. See NELLIS, supra note 52, at 3 (“In the federal system, for example, as
far back as 1913, parole reviews took place after serving 15 years, though
remaining incarcerated for the rest of one’s life was still possible.”).

2156

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2147 (2018)

the laws to allow for parole after serving ten years of a life
sentence.54 This change led Justice William Brennan to call life
imprisonment a misnomer in his concurrence in Furman v.
Georgia,55 the decision imposing a temporary moratorium on
executions.56
The Furman decision, in fact, spurred the modern uptick in
life without parole sentences.57 States reacted to the nationwide
moratorium on death sentences by turning to life without parole
sentences to provide deterrence and satisfy community demands
for proportionate punishment.58 The fervor for life without parole
as a sentencing option did not diminish when the Court, just four
years later, sanctioned new permissible death penalty schemes.59
Instead, both law-and-order advocates60 and death penalty
abolitionists61 rallied broad support behind life without parole
sentences. For law-and-order advocates, the addition of life
without parole sentences supplemented use of the death penalty
as a means to “throw away the key” on violent or incorrigible

54. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat.
219 (1976) (repealed 1984).
55. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
56. See id. at 302 n.54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that because life
imprisonment rarely meant life, a mandatory life without parole sentence for
crimes committed while incarcerated would serve as a deterrent).
57. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 96
[T]he same backlash that brought the death penalty back to life led to
a surge in states adopting [life without parole]. Some states . . . did so
in direct response to Furman. Others, acting in the 1980s, did so in
direct response to new skepticism at the possibility of rehabilitation
and to a rise in “tough on crime” attitudes generally.
58. See id. at 97 (explaining that states considered life without parole as
providing “all the benefits of the death penalty but without the executions”).
59. See id. at 96 (describing the continued increase of life without parole
statutes during the 1980s and beyond).
60. See id. (articulating the cause of “tough on crime” individuals to
implement life without parole because of the impossibility of rehabilitation).
61. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1116 (explaining that abolitionists believed
the public would be more likely to support death penalty repeal and juries would
be more likely to vote against death sentences if life without parole existed as an
option).
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offenders.62 Abolitionists, on the other hand, approved of the option
as a means of discouraging death penalty verdicts.63
The result was a wide-spread incorporation of life without
parole sentencing into criminal sentencing codes.64 By 1990,
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia had adopted life
without parole.65 By 2012, every state except Alaska had adopted
life without parole for some crimes, and six states and the federal
government had eliminated parole altogether.66
With the death penalty moratorium and the rapid advance of
life without parole sentences, the Supreme Court toyed with
applying Eighth Amendment scrutiny to life without parole.67 In
Solem v. Helm,68 the Court affirmed the reversal of the life without
parole sentence of a defendant whose six non-violent offenses over
a fifteen year period69 made him eligible to serve life without parole
as a habitual offender.70Although the trial court found Helm
“beyond rehabilitation,”71 there was significant evidence that his
crimes stemmed from alcoholism.72 The Court, drawing on the
Eighth Amendment analysis usually reserved for death penalty
62. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 98 (questioning whether Texas, the last
state to adopt life without parole, saw it as a “powerful supplement” to deal with
juveniles and the intellectually disabled, whom the Supreme Court had recently
said could not be sentenced to death).
63. See id. at 97 (citing public opinion polls and studies of capital juries as
suggesting that the availability of life without parole discourages jurors from
selecting death).
64. See id. at 96 (describing the steady increase of states with life without
parole statutes).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267–68 (1974) (rejecting a challenge to
the constitutionality of a life without parole sentence for a death sentenced
prisoner whose sentence was later commuted on the condition he never be granted
release).
68. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
69. See id. at 279–81 (recounting Helm’s convictions for three third-degree
burglaries, one obtaining money under false pretenses, and a DUI before his final
offense—uttering a “no account” check for $100).
70. Id. at 284; see also id. at 281 (reciting the recidivist statute for South
Dakota as authorizing a maximum penalty of life without parole for a defendant
charged with a felony and who has at least three prior convictions).
71. Id. at 282–83.
72. See id. at 297 n.22 (rejecting the suggestion that Helm was a professional
criminal, rather than an alcoholic who struggled to maintain employment).
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cases,73 found the sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate.74
Whatever opening this provided to challenge life without parole
sentences under the Eighth Amendment was swiftly closed.75 In
Harmelin v. Michigan,76 the Court, reviewing a mandatory life
without parole sentence for drug possession, effectively eliminated
the distinction between life without parole and other life
sentences.77 There would be no separate category for life without
parole sentences.78 Courts would not be required to make
individualized sentencing determinations to ensure the sentence
was not disproportionate, as they were with death penalty
sentencing.79 In practice, this cut off Eighth Amendment review of
life without parole sentences because states could reserve life
without parole for violent crimes and drug offenses,80 and courts
could sentence habitual nonviolent offenders to “virtual life” term
of years sentences that stretched well beyond an offender’s life
expectancy.81

73. See id. at 292
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.
74. Id. at 303; see also id. at 297 n.22 (“Incarcerating him for life without
the possibility of parole is unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice
system in any substantial way.”).
75. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1119 (“Yet if Solem intimated a possible
movement in a European direction, fraught with qualms and equivocations about
the harshness of [life without parole], Harmelin v. Michigan, decided just eight
years later, returned America to its distinctively punitive path.”).
76. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
77. See id. at 996 (“It is true that petitioner’s [life] sentence is unique in that
it is the second most severe known to the law; but life imprisonment with
possibility of parole is also unique in that it is the third most severe.”).
78. See id. (reasoning that life without parole still allowed for “retroactive
legislative reduction and executive clemency”).
79. See id. at 995 – 96 (rejecting the idea of an “individualized mandatory life
in prison without parole sentencing doctrine”).
80. See id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (distinguishing Helm based on
the severity of the offense, hinting that the Court could still apply scrutiny to life
without parole sentences, so long as they were for minor crimes).
81. See Lerner, supra note 45, at 1119 (“In theory, this intimated a
willingness to apply meaningful scrutiny to [life without parole] sentences
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The inclusion of life without parole as a sentencing option may
have begun as a response to Furman and the tough-on-crime
movement of the 1980s and 1990s,82 but its use has not diminished
to reflect the decline in crime since that period.83 Instead, there are
now tens of thousands of prisoners for whom death would not have
been permissible, but this “other death penalty”84 has been
mandatorily applied.85
By the time Miller v. Alabama86 was decided in 2012, one in
nine prisoners—nearly 160,000 people—was serving a life
sentence.87 Nearly a third of those prisoners were serving life
without parole, and this number was rising more than life
sentences with the possibility of parole.88 Approximately 2,500 of
those serving life without parole were juveniles at the time of the
offense.89
That so many juvenile offenders have been swept up in this
expansion of life without parole sentencing is particularly notable
imposed for minor offenses. In practice, however, this qualification proved easy to
satisfy.”).
82. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 170 (attributing the surge in the number
of states with life without parole to a combination of states seeking “whole life”
alternatives in response to the moratorium on death sentences in the 1970s and
then tough on crime sentencing measures in the following decades).
83. See NELLIS, supra note 52, at 15 (charting the decline in overall prison
populations versus the increase in parole ineligible lifers in Michigan, New York,
and New Jersey from 2000 to 2010).
84. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 170 (using the terminology of capital
punishment in referring to the creation of “life rows,” vastly larger than any death
row, where prisoners are similarly fated to die on prison grounds); see also id. at
172 (quoting Ashley Nellis, the author of a 2017 study on life without parole
sentences, as saying, “Life in prison is a death sentence, without the execution”);
Mario M. Cuomo, Editorial, New York State Shouldn’t Kill People, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/opinion/new-york-stateshouldn-t-kill-people.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (defending his veto of bills to
reintroduce the death penalty in New York by referring to the alternative, life
without parole, as effectively “a sentence of death in incarceration”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. See GARRETT, supra note 49, at 167–86 (discussing the relationship
between this boom in life without parole sentencing and the decline in death
sentencing).
86. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
87. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 1.
88. See id. (observing a 22.2% increase in life without parole sentences since
2008).
89. Id. at 11.
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because of the length of time these offenders will spend
incarcerated.90 It is also notable because it cuts against the
criminal justice system’s general desire to treat children offenders
differently.91 In order for juvenile offenders to face mandatory life
without parole sentences, prosecutors had to first make a
threshold decision that those children should in fact be tried as
adults. As the next section shows, the American criminal justice
system’s treatment of juvenile offenders evolved in such a manner
to bring about the Supreme Court’s intervention.
B. Harsher Treatment of Juveniles
The second force leading to the Miller/Montgomery line of
cases was the shift in attitude towards the justice system’s
treatment of juvenile offenders.92 During the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries, there was a “revolution” in the states’
attitudes towards juvenile offenders: “Our common criminal law
did not differentiate between the adult and the minor who had
reached the age of criminal responsibility . . . .”93 Julian Mack,
writing in the Harvard Law Review, lamented that the focus on
inflicting a punishment proportional to the crime rather than
reforming the juvenile offender “criminalized [youths] by the very
methods that it used in dealing with them.”94 New reforms,
however, reflected “the thought that the child who has begun to go
90. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (“[A] juvenile offender will
on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an
adult offender.”); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016) (noting the
petitioner had already served over fifty years for the crime he committed as a
seventeen-year-old).
91. This is evidenced most notably by the entirely separate juvenile justice
system and the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons to disallow the
death penalty for juveniles. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJp
art1.authcheckdam.pdf (describing the history and changing attitudes toward the
juvenile justice system); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the
juvenile death penalty).
92. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 91 (charting this development of the
juvenile justice system).
93. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909).
94. See id. at 106–07 (“[T]he punishment was visited in proportion to the
degree of wrongdoing evidenced by the single act; not by the needs of the boy, not
by the needs of the state.”).
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wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance,
is to be taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a
protector, as the ultimate guardian.”95 In 1899, the first juvenile
court—providing juveniles with court proceedings separated from
adult offenders —opened in Cook County, Illinois.96 By 1945 there
were juvenile courts in every state.97
Alongside this push to separate juvenile and adult justice
systems was a move to increase the age of criminal responsibility.98
Recognizing, presciently, that adolescence extends through age
twenty-five, Arthur Towne, the Superintendent of the Brooklyn
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, argued that
treating sixteen-year-olds as possessing the reasoning capabilities
of adults “flies in the face of present-day psychology and the hard
facts.”99 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court legitimized the juvenile
system by guaranteeing that due process protections extended to
juvenile courts.100 The first half of the twentieth century, thus,
reflected what Clifford Simonsen and Marshall Gordon, referred to
as slow movement “away from an age of reform and punishment to
an age of rehabilitation and understanding.”101 Even outside of the
corrective focus of juvenile courts, there was a renewed focus in
preventing juvenile delinquency through intervention, providing
at-risk youths with opportunities to upgrade their educations and
learn a skill or trade.102 This prevention focus was reflected in the
1960’s in the creation of the Jobs Corp. under the Federal Poverty

95. Id.
96. See CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN & MARSHALL S. GORDON, III, JUVENILE JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 27 (2d ed. 1982) (detailing the origins of the juvenile court system).
97. Id.
98. See Arthur W. Towne, Shall the Age Jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts be
Increased?, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 501 (1920) (advocating
for an increased age of criminal responsibility for juvenile offenders).
99. Id.
100. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (recognizing that the basic
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, such as the right to counsel and
notice of charges, are extended to juvenile defendants in juvenile court).
101. SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 96, at 29.
102. See id. at 38 (explaining the desire to intervene early with at-risk youths
by providing skills and job training).
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Program.103 However, by 1979, Simonsen and Gordon observed
attitudes swinging back towards a focus on punishment.104
In 1978, in response to the light sentencing of a
fifteen-year-old convicted of murder, New York introduced the
automatic transfer law, allowing children as young as thirteen to
be tried as adults for murder.105 Between 1990 and 1996, forty
states had passed similar laws allowing for juveniles to be
prosecuted as adults.106 An uptick in violent crime in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, including a notable increase in juvenile
homicides, compounded this change in attitudes.107 The national
homicide rate increased from 7.9 per 100,000 U.S. residents in
1984 to an all-time peak of 9.8 per 100,000 U.S. residents in
1991.108 Over nearly the same period, the homicide rate for
juveniles nearly tripled.109
This crime increase led to hysteria over the rise of the “juvenile
superpredators”110—“kids who have no respect for human life and

103. See id. (noting that though the main goal of these programs was to
provide youths opportunities, there was a secondary goal in preventing
delinquency).
104. Id.
105. See Katie Rose Quandt, Why Does the U.S. Sentence Children to Life in
Prison?, JSTOR DAILY (Jan. 31, 2018), https://daily.jstor.org/u-s-sentencechildren-life-prison/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (articulating New York’s automatic
transfer law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. See id. (highlighting additional laws, such as those to open juvenile
records, set mandatory minimum sentences, and replace phrases like
“rehabilitation” and “best interests of the child” with “punishment” and
“protection of the public”).
107. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 642 (explaining how the
increase in the juvenile homicide rate led academics, such as John Dilulio, to
predict “a coming tidal wave of remorseless and morally impoverished youth,” the
so-called “juvenile superpredator”).
108. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008 2 (2011).
109. Id. at 4.
110. For more information on the origin of the term superpredators and a
discussion of the racial undertones, see Kevin Drum, A Very Brief History of
Super-Predators,
MOTHER
JONES
(Mar.
3,
2016,
5:04
PM),
https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/03/very-brief-history-superpredators/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator Fear’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-
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no sense of the future . . . [who] kill or maim on impulse, without
any intelligible motive.”111 Though the superpredator theory would
later be disproved as a myth,112 it created a heated and fearful
rhetorical climate that changed the attitude towards juvenile
offenders as a whole.113 This climate spurred legislative efforts to
transfer more juveniles into the adult criminal justice system.114
The new transfer laws differed from past efforts in that they gave
prosecutors or the legislature, not judges, the power to decide
whether a juvenile should face “adult time for an adult crime.”115
Second, for crimes such as murder, there was no bottom age limit
on those who could be transferred and tried as adults.116 The result
was a large number of juveniles under eighteen-years-old—a 1999
study suggested the number could be 200,000 each year —being
tried as adults for a variety of crimes.117
superpredator-threat-of-90s.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
111. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY
STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995, 12:00AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/john-jdilulio-jr/the-coming-of-the-super-predators (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) (“[A]s long
as their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes ‘naturally’: murder,
rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. See YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2001)
(finding “there is no evidence that the young people involved in violence during
the peak years of the early 1990s were more frequent or more vicious offenders
than youth in earlier years”); see also Brief of Jeffery Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 37, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No.
10-9647), 2012 WL 174240 (summarizing data showing Dilulio’s predictions of
continued increases in juvenile crime were wrong and signed by Dilulio himself).
113. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 642 – 43 (recounting the
alarmist rhetoric used to attack the juvenile court system in light of the
superpredator crisis).
114. See Robert J. Smith & Zoe Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the
Progression of Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 486 (2017) (“This
super-predator rhetoric significantly contributed to sharp increases in life
without parole sentences for juveniles, as well as the transfer of cases from
juvenile to adult court.”).
115. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 665 – 66 (distinguishing the
1990s revolution in transfer laws from the former system of juvenile transfer
which had been reserved for recidivists or those who committed especially heinous
crimes).
116. See id. at 666, n.99 (citing twenty-three states with provisions placing no
bottom limit on the age of transferable juvenile offenders for specific crimes).
117. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST.,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 106 (1999) (including
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The approach lent itself to an oft-recited appeal for “adult time
for adult crimes.”118 David Tanenhaus and Steven Drizin point out
that, through the abolition of parole and the institution of
mandatory minimum sentencing, by the mid-1990s “youth had
ceased to be a mitigating factor in adult court and instead had
become a liability.”119 Juvenile transfers convicted of murder, on
average, received longer sentences than their adult
counterparts.120
As states moved to recast their treatment of juvenile offenders
back into the terms of punishment and dispositions based more on
the offense than the offender, evidence emerged to challenge the
notion of “super-predators” and open a space for the possibility of
a new reform movement. Juvenile crime decreased between 1994
and 2000,121 and in 2001 the U.S. Surgeon General debunked the
super-predator myth.122 Between 2002 and 2011 there was a
further 31% drop in juvenile arrests.123
Empirical studies also showed that the states’ legislative
changes were not causally responsible for the decline in juvenile
homicide rates.124 In fact, those states with the greatest decrease
as transfers those transferred under judicial waiver, those statutorily excluded
from juvenile court because of the nature of the crime, and those under eighteen
tried in states that set the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction at fifteen or
sixteen).
118. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 2, at 664 (referencing the use of this
mantra in arguing for tougher juvenile transfer laws).
119. Id. at 665.
120. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 117, at 178 (“On average, the
maximum prison sentence imposed on transferred juveniles convicted of murder
in 1994 was 23 years 11 months. This was 2 years and 5 months longer than the
average maximum prison sentence for adults age 18 or older.”).
121. Quandt, supra note 105.
122. See YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 112, at 5 (“[T]here is no evidence that
the young people involved in violence during the peak years of the early 1990s
were more frequent or more vicious offenders than youth in earlier years.”).
123. ASHLEY NELLIS, A RETURN TO JUSTICE: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO
JUVENILES IN THE SYSTEM 71 (2016).
124. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS:
THE
CASE
FOR
REDUCING
JUVENILE
INCARCERATION
26
(2011),
https://www.juvenile-in-justice.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/NoPlaceForKids.pdf (“[F]rom 1997 to 2007, the states
that decreased juvenile confinement rates most sharply (40 percent or more) saw
a slightly greater decline in juvenile violent crime arrest rates than states that
increased their youth confinement rates.”).
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in juvenile confinement rates between 1997 and 2007 saw a greater
decline in juvenile crime rates than the national average.125
Further, there was no difference in crime rate between those states
which authorized life without parole versus life with parole
sentences or those that automatically transferred all juveniles over
the age of sixteen to adult court versus those that transferred more
selectively.126 It turned out there was little evidence that the
prospect of longer sentences had any significant deterrent effect on
adolescents.127 Thus, at the time the Supreme Court started
considering these juvenile life without parole cases, the cloud had
begun to lift and reveal the misconceptions of the superpredator
era, yet the statutory implications of this draconian approach
towards juveniles remained in place.
C. Brain Science and Scientific Development Impacts on
Sentencing
The third force leading to Supreme Court’s juvenile life
without parole jurisprudence was the emergence of adolescent
brain research. This research supported the theory that for some
juveniles delinquency is part of adolescence that most will outgrow
without the strong-handed interventions being legislatively
prescribed in the 1980s and 90s.128
Since at least the nineteenth century, reformers had
attempted to apply scientific explanations to juvenile

125.
126.

See id. (detailing national averages for juvenile crime and confinement).
See James Alan Fox, Abolish Life Without Parole in Mass.,
CORRECTIONS.COM
(Nov.
21,
2011),
http://www.corrections.com/news/article/29641-abolish-juvenile-life-withoutparole-in-mass- (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (analyzing the 1996 Massachusetts
statute that made life without parole mandatory for all juveniles fourteen and
older convicted of first-degree murder, and showing no subsequent impact on
juvenile homicide rates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can
Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9, 14 (2011) (showing that for
both adolescents and young adults an increase in the risk of arrest has a greater
deterrent effect than the threat of longer prison sentences).
128. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 78 (crediting this new research-based
policy framework with discrediting the earlier theories about juvenile offenders’
inclination toward crime).
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elinquency.129 Jane Addams, the founder of Hull House and
renowned children’s welfare reformer, subscribed to the
recapitulation theory,130 the theory that juvenile delinquency is the
result of forces of good and evil battling for possession of a child’s
soul.131 Through proper guidance and influence, juveniles could be
turned into “angels of virtue.”132 A contemporary of Addams,
William Forbush, pushed a theory that troublesome juveniles were
stuck in “psychic arrest”—periods of continued tendencies towards
crime.133 If this period of psychic arrest did not pass, the juvenile
was “considered locked into a life of crime.”134 These early theories
lacked empirical verification, and “sound scientific explanations
for delinquent behavior failed to permeate the institutional
atmospheres of the day.”135
During the 1980s and 90s, medical and psychosocial research
on the development of the adolescent brain began to emerge, which
would become the basis for reassessing juvenile culpability and
sentencing.136 Led by Laurence Steinberg, an internationally
renowned expert on adolescence, the Research Network on
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice focused on
adolescents’ competence, culpability, and capacity for change.137
In terms of competence—the ability to understand the judicial
process and meaningfully contribute to one’s own defense—
129. See SIMONSEN & GORDON, supra note 96, at 25–26 (explaining the
emergence of treatments designed to change human behavior with the
introduction of social science research).
130. See id. at 26 (describing Jane Addams’s support of recapitulation theory).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 26–27 (chronicling how nonscientific attitudes based on
economic, moral, and political forces slowed the advancement of scientific theories
on delinquency); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 10 – 11(1969) (“[S]tudies of delinquency in the early 1900s have been
parochial, inadequately descriptive and show little appreciation of underlying
political and social conditions.”).
136. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 79 (noting that the development of
adolescent brain research coincided with increasing criticism of the rehabilitation
focus of pre-1980s juvenile justice systems).
137. See id. (“In particular, researchers examined whether deficits in any or
all of these should be considered mitigating factors in criminal liability and, by
extension, in sentencing.”).
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Steinberg recommended a categorical exclusion of juveniles from
adult courts.138 Similar to those with serious mental illness or
intellectual disability, Steinberg suggested that juveniles’ age
should be considered a preexisting impairment because they were
more vulnerable to pressures from authority figures, such as police
and legal counsel.139
In terms of culpability, research revealed that although a
teenager’s cognitive abilities may be on par with an adult’s, their
emotional, cognitive, and psychosocial maturity are still
developing.140 This, in turn, is the reason adolescents routinely
disregard the long-term consequences of their action and why they
are predisposed to take risks and act impulsively.141
Finally, the research focused on juvenile offenders’ prospects
for reform. Steinberg and his colleagues found that an adolescent’s
prospects for reform are greater than for a mature adult.142 In
rebutting the diagnosis of “juvenile psychopathy,” they concluded
that antisocial activity in adolescence is not usually indicative of
bad character—their bad acts tend to be out of character —and
there is no evidence that juveniles who display characteristics of
adult psychopaths (i.e. juveniles who are callous, manipulative,
and antisocial) actually become adult psychopaths.143
These findings were supported by the findings of
neuroscientists from Harvard Medical School, the National
Institute of Mental Health, and UCLA’s School of Medicine, who
produced analyses of the prefrontal cortex to demonstrate why

138. See id. at 80 (arguing that typical remedies, such as using medications
to establish competency, would be ineffective for juveniles).
139. Id.
140. See id. (discussing research on the comparative culpability of juveniles
and adults).
141. See id. (“This rational balancing of pros and cons does not become a
regular feature in decision making until adulthood.”).
142. See id. (opposing the argument that juveniles are more capable of
modifying their behavior).
143. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1015 (2003) (“Although the notion
that some juvenile offenders are actual or ‘fledgling’ psychopaths has become
increasingly popular in legal and psychological circles, no data exist on the
stability or continuity of psychopathy between adolescence and adulthood.”).
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teenagers sometimes act irrationally.144 Comparing MRI scans of
the prefrontal cortex through time, the researchers detected an
important “growth spurt” in the brain that begins in
adolescence.145 The prefrontal cortex, the brain’s primary
decision-maker, continued developing well into a person’s
twenties.146 For juveniles, this meant their brains were still
maturing, and they did not yet possess the physiological abilities
of adults to control their impulses, exercise judgment, or entirely
comprehend the consequences of their actions.147
These scientific findings, thus, revealed a fundamental
disconnect between what researchers now knew about the
characteristic features of adolescents and the assumptions of the
criminal justice system about juveniles.148 While some
developmental research was available to the Supreme Court when
it first addressed the juvenile death penalty in 1989,149 these new
findings would shake the manner in which the Court assessed
juvenile criminal culpability.150 While the research presented in
the 1980s suggested that moral development was a long-term
process that juveniles had not yet completed, it had lacked the
strength of this neuroscience-backed evidence.151 When the Court
was called upon to readdress juvenile criminal culpability
beginning with Roper, relevant organizations of psychiatrists,
144. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 81 (detailing the research findings of
several neuroscientists on juvenile behavior).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 23 – 26 (2012) (recollecting the history of research
developments as to the heterogeneity of juvenile offending).
149. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of a death sentence given to a seventeen-year-old offender); see
also Kevin W. Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations
on Juvenile Punishment, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 339, 340 (2013) (“The science did
not study the physical structure of the relevant regions of the brain, but presented
conclusions based on examining the behavior of children and asking them
questions involving moral decision-making.”).
150. For a comprehensive analysis of the neuroscience developments between
Stanford and Roper, see Saunders, supra note 149.
151. See id. at 347 (observing that in the juvenile cases from the 1980s, the
breakdown amongst the judges reflected those who believed the
observational-based science versus those who did not).
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psychologists, mental health, and juvenile experts inundated the
court with amicus briefs urging the Court to consider this new
research-supported understanding.152 As the discussion of the
cases in Part III shows, this new scientific evidence was an
essential component of the Supreme Court’s juvenile decisions
holding that, in essence, “kids are different.”153
III. Creation and Development of the Irreparable Corruption
Standard
These behind-the-scenes forces put the criminal justice system
and brain science on a collision course. As the criminal justice
system treated more and more juvenile offenders as adults, and
correspondingly
deemed
more
offenders
incapable
of
rehabilitation, the scientific developments were showing the
opposite—children were not only less culpable than adult
offenders, they were also the most capable of rehabilitation.154
Despite this new evidence, juvenile reform advocates encountered
a Supreme Court wary to interfere with the states’ control of their
criminal justice systems. As the Harmelin decision showed,155 the
Court was unwilling to listen to Eighth Amendment challenges to
criminal sentences as being excessive or disproportionate, unless
the sentence was death.156 Under the banner of “death is different,”
the Supreme Court had only been willing to strike down capital
152. See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Ass’n & the Missouri
Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447; Brief for American Medical
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549.
153. See NELLIS, supra note 123, at 83 (“This new narrative, rooted in science,
was critical to the opinions of the Supreme Court in its four juvenile justice
rulings over the past decade, but the view that ‘kids are different’ has had
spillover effects to broader juvenile justice reforms as well.”).
154. See supra Part II.A–C (discussing the contemporary developments in
juvenile brain science and criminal sanctioning).
155. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the Supreme Court’s aborted efforts to
analyze the excessiveness or disproportionality of life without parole sentences in
the 1980s).
156. See infra Parts III.B, IV (discussing how Graham marked a significant
expansion of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis out of the confines
of capital jurisprudence).
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verdicts under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.157 Now,
this confluence of harsher sentencing of juveniles and scientific
developments questioning that approach led the Court to consider
expanding its Eighth Amendment review to meet this problem.
The fix, however, has created further problems for the states, as
they are left to determine whether juvenile offenders can be
deemed irreparably corrupt.
This Part looks at how the Supreme Court utilized its Eighth
Amendment framework to find the juvenile death penalty
unconstitutional and then expanded this Eighth Amendment
analysis to consider whether sentencing juvenile offenders to die
in prison also constituted cruel and unusual punishment.158 Then,
this Part will discuss the Court’s decisions in Miller and
Montgomery, and the creation of the irreparably corrupt standard
for determining whether juvenile offenders should be sentenced to
life without parole.159 Finally, this Part will turn to the scientific
and procedural difficulties that state courts face in trying develop
the irreparable corruption standard.160
A. The Road to Miller and Montgomery
The idea that states must reassess the boundaries of
punishment is derived from the concept that the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause is an
evolving standard that must meet the norms and morality of the
present day.161 The bulk of modern Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence deals with the application of the death penalty.162
157. See Mary Berkheiser, Death is Not So Different After All: Graham v.
Florida and the Court’s “Kids are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence,
36 VT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (describing the Court’s categorical approach to the
Eighth Amendment as “formerly the exclusive province of the death penalty”).
158. Infra Part III.A.
159. Infra Part III.B.
160. Infra Part III.C.
161. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“[T]he [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”).
162. See Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz, Procedures for
Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital
Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (2016) (pointing out that the Supreme
Court “rarely invalidated noncapital sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds”).
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But, as the Supreme Court noted in Coker v. Georgia,163 the Eighth
Amendment bars not just “barbaric” punishments, but those that
are excessive in relation to the crime.164
In assessing whether a punishment categorically runs afoul of
the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court developed a two-part
inquiry.165 First, the Court asks whether there is a consensus about
the acceptableness of the sentence.166 Then, the Court applies its
own judgement to ask whether the sentence is unconstitutionally
excessive.167 A punishment can be unconstitutionally excessive in
one of two ways: (1) it does not contribute to an acceptable goal of
punishment such as deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation168 or (2) it is grossly disproportionate to the crime.169
After Gregg, the Supreme Court used this Eighth Amendment
framework to prohibit the use of the death penalty for certain
categories of offenders170 and for certain offenses.171 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Supreme Court utilized its Eighth Amendment

163. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (summarizing the takeaway from the plurality
and two concurring opinions in Gregg v. Georgia, the decision reaffirming the use
of the death penalty).
164. See id. (providing the precedent that would guide the Court’s future
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
165. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976) (establishing an
objective and a subjective component of the Eighth Amendment analysis).
166. See id. at 175–76, 181 (analyzing state legislative activity and juries’
sentencing decisions as “significant and reliable objective ind[ices] of
contemporary values”).
167. See id. at 182 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment demands more than that a
challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court must
ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of
the Amendment.”).
168. See id. (elaborating that such a punishment “is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring capital
punishment for intellectually disabled offenders); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 410 (1986) (barring capital punishment from being inflicted on a prisoner
who is insane).
171. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 439 (2008) (barring
capital punishment for rape of a child or other offenses not resulting in the death
of the victim); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (barring capital
punishment for rape of an adult victim).
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framework to strike down capital punishment for juvenile
offenders—those under eighteen at the time of the offense.172
The Court first looked to state legislative action and
“consistency of the direction of change”173 and the decline in actual
use of the penalty174 to find that a national consensus had emerged
against the juvenile death penalty, as thirty states did not impose
the death penalty on juveniles.175 Next, the Court applied its own
independent judgment to determine that the juvenile death
penalty was both disproportionately severe and imposed on a class
of people with an inherently diminished capacity.176 According to
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the death penalty is reserved for a
narrow category of crimes177 and the worst offenders,178 those
“whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of
execution.”179
The Court cited three distinctions between juvenile and adult
offenders that prevented juveniles from being reliably classified
among the worst offenders.180 First, juveniles are comparatively
172. See id. at 578 (holding that the Eighth Amendment
“forbid[s] . . . imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age
of 18 when their crimes were committed”).
173. See id. at 566 (noting that since its prior decision upholding the death
penalty for offenders between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, five states had
abolished their juvenile death penalty); but see id. at 595–96 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (challenging the majority’s consensus by noting the slow pace— only
five states in fifteen years— and the lack of uniformity of the change—two states,
Virginia and Missouri, “expressly reaffirmed their support” by enacting statutes
setting sixteen as the minimum age).
174. See id. at 563 (counting only three states that had actually executed
juveniles in the decade prior).
175. Id. at 560.
176. Id. at 567–75.
177. See id. at 568 (noting the Court’s previous rejection of imposition of the
death penalty for even severe crimes, such as rape of an adult woman and felony
murder where the defendant did not attempt to, intend to, or actually kill the
victim) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982)).
178. See id. (“The death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of
offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded no
matter how heinous the crime.”).
179. Id. at 572.
180. See id. at 570–71 (recalling that the Court had relied on these distinct
characteristics of those under the age of sixteen to find the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the death penalty for that group).
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immature and irresponsible.181 Second, juveniles are “more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures.”182 Third, a juvenile’s personality traits are not set,
allowing for greater possibility for rehabilitation.183 Because of
these unique characteristics, the Court concluded that juvenile
offenders were less culpable for their crimes.184
In turn, juvenile offenders’ diminished culpability makes the
recognized justifications for the death penalty—retribution and
deterrence—inadequate.185 The Court found the retributive
purpose, as an expression of the community’s moral outrage or
attempt to avenge the victim, was ill-served where the juvenile
offender’s immaturity made him less blameworthy.186 Likewise,
the argument for deterrence fails because juveniles are extremely
unlikely to have made a cost-benefit analysis that considered the
possibility of execution.187 Without a valid penological justification,
imposition of the juvenile death penalty is automatically
disproportionate and, thus, a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.188
181. See id. at 569 (relaying “what any parent knows” and what “scientific
and sociological studies” tend to confirm, children’s immaturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to adolescents being “overrepresented
statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior” (quoting Jeffrey
Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992))).
182. See id. at 569–70 (“Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim
than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole
environment.”).
183. See id. (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by
a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character . . . for a greater
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 571–72 (“We have held there are two distinct social purposes
served by thedeath penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by
prospective offenders.”).
186. See id. at 571 (“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to
a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”).
187. See id. at 572 (reasoning that even if a case could be made for the
deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty, the sentence of life without parole
is “itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person”).
188. Id. at 571–72, 575.
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In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the argument
that a categorical ban was an overreach because there may be
juvenile offenders who commit heinous crimes and possess
“sufficient psychological maturity.”189 The Court concluded that
allowing jurors to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
juvenile was sufficiently culpable would create an “unacceptable
likelihood” that the heinous nature of the crime might overpower
any mitigation based on the youth of the offender.190 The danger
was that a jury, presented with a juvenile whose immaturity,
vulnerability, and “lack of true depravity” should warrant a
sentence less than death, could be so inflamed by the brutality of
the crime that they might unjustly sentence him to death.191 To
bolster this argument, the Court pointed out, “It is difficult even
for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”192 The Court declined to encumber jurors
with a task that trained psychologists, with the benefits of
diagnostic expertise, clinical testing, and observation, would
struggle to reliably assess.193 Life without parole, thus, became the
harshest available penalty for a juvenile offender.
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida194 expanded
the Eighth Amendment’s reach to strike down the imposition of life
without parole sentences to juveniles who committed
“nonhomicide” crimes.195 The Court recognized that life without
189. See id. at 572 (dismissing petitioner’s argument that the Supreme
Court’s past insistence on individualized consideration of the mitigating and
aggravating factors in a death penalty case made the adoption of a categorical bar
both arbitrary and unnecessary).
190. See id. at 573 (pointing out that in Simmons’s case, the prosecutor even
argued that the defendant’s youth should be treated as an aggravating factor
because his longevity would make him a danger for longer).
191. See id. (suggesting that the brutality of a particular crime may blind a
jury to any mitigating facts of youth).
192. See id. (explaining that psychiatrists are prohibited by the American
Psychiatric Association from diagnosing juveniles under eighteen as having
antisocial personality disorder, commonly referred to a psychopathy or
sociopathy).
193. Id.
194. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
195. Id. at 53.
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parole is an “especially harsh punishment for a juvenile” because
they will, on average, serve more years and a greater percentage
of their lives in prison than a non-juvenile lifer.196 Accordingly, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment required that juveniles
convicted of non-homicide offenses must be provided a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”197
As with Roper, the Court again rejected the idea that juries
should be allowed to determine if a particular offender might have
“sufficient psychological maturity” to overcome the Court’s
concerns.198 Again, the Court reiterated that the differences
between juvenile and adult offenders are too well understood to
risk sentencing a juvenile with diminished culpability to life
without parole.199
Separately, the Court reasoned that even outside of the death
penalty context, “[i]t remains true that ‘[f]rom a moral standpoint
it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those
of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character
deficiencies will be reformed.’”200 The Court pointed out that such
a penalty served no rehabilitative purpose and as such was
inappropriate in light of the juvenile nonhomicide offender’s
capacity for change.201

196. See id. at 70 (noting that a sixteen-year-old and seventy-five-year-old
each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only).
197. See id. at 75 (“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility
that [offenders] will remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit States from
making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter
society.”).
198. See id. (“Categorical rules tend to be imperfect, but one is necessary
here.”).
199. See id. at 69 (finding a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill
has a “twice diminished culpability”).
200. Id. at 68 (second alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
201. See id. at 74 (noting that those serving life without parole are often
denied rehabilitative services available to other inmates, further evidencing the
disproportionality of the sentence when applied to juveniles, who are “most in
need of and receptive to rehabilitation”).
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B. Miller, Montgomery, and the Irreparable Corruption Standard
In 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama202 extended
Graham to prohibit the imposition of all mandatory life without
parole sentences for juvenile offenders.203 Drawing on the brain
science research cited in Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court
reiterated that “children are constitutionally different from adults
for purposes of sentencing.”204 Because of their diminished
culpability and greater capacity for reform, “imposition of a State’s
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as
though they were not children.”205 The Court used the petitioners’
circumstances to illustrate the diminished culpability argument.
Kuntrell Jackson’s background was so immersed in violence that
both “his mother and grandmother had previously shot other
individuals.”206 As for Evan Miller, he had been physically abused
by his stepfather and neglected by his alcoholic and drug-addicted
mother to the point that by age fourteen, he had attempted suicide
four times.207 Mandatory life without parole would, thus,
“disregard the possibility of rehabilitation even when
circumstances most suggest it.”208
However, the Court opted to not issue a categorical ban on the
imposition of life without parole sentences for juveniles but merely
found the Eighth Amendment prohibited sentencing schemes
which made such penalties mandatory.209 The Court reasoned that
“[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
202. 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012). The Supreme Court consolidated Miller, a case
on direct appeal, with Jackson v. Hobbs, in which Kuntrell Jackson, who like
Evan Miller was fourteen at the time his offense was committed, challenged ,on
post-conviction, his life without parole sentence for felony murder. Id. at 466.
203. See id. at 479 (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory
life without parole sentencing schemes for juveniles, because “[b]y making youth
(and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison
sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment”).
204. See id. at 471 (reciting from Graham the three major differences between
juveniles and adults for the purposes of sentencing: immaturity; vulnerability to
outside pressures and their environments; and chance for reform).
205. Id. at 474.
206. Id. at 478.
207. Id. at 478–79.
208. Id. at 478.
209. See id. at 479 (finding such schemes pose “too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment”).
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consideration of chronological age and its hallmark features—
among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate
risks and consequences.”210 The Court did opine that such
sentences should be rare based on the discussion in Roper and
Graham of juveniles diminished culpability, their capacity for
change, and the difficulty of “distinguishing at this early age
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.”211
In the end, the Miller decision carved out a small segment of
juveniles for whom a life without parole sentence was still
constitutionally permissible: the rare, irreparably corrupt juvenile
homicide offender.212 This has become a de facto sentencing
standard that authorizes a sentencer, whether judge or jury, to
impose the harsher life without parole sentence only after
(1) considering the mitigating effects of youth; and (2) making a
finding of irreparable corruption.213
This issue resurfaced in Montgomery v. Louisiana214 when the
Supreme Court was called upon to settle a split between the states
as to whether Miller applied retroactively to 2,100 inmates who
had already been convicted as juveniles and sentenced under a
mandatory sentencing scheme to life without parole.215 In light of
Miller, Henry Montgomery, a sixty-nine-year-old inmate,
challenged his continued incarceration on a mandatory sentence of
life without parole for a crime Montgomery committed in 1963 as
a seventeen-year-old.216

210. Id. at 477.
211. Id.
212. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (mandating that
nonhomicide juvenile offenders may never receive life without parole sentences);
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (providing that the remaining homicide juvenile
offenders could only receive life without parole in the rare circumstances where
the sentencer concludes that the youth is irreparably corrupt).
213. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005).
214. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
215. See Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, POLICY BRIEF: JUVENILE
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (The Sentencing Project, New York, N.Y.), updated August
2017, at 2 (summarizing Montgomery and its impact).
216. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (providing the factual background of
the case).
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In order for a newly announced rule to apply retroactively to
cases with a final disposition, the new rule must be either a new
substantive rule of constitutional law217 or a new “watershed”
procedural rule.218 The Court’s review in Montgomery, thus,
focused on whether the Miller decision, in fact created a new
substantive rule, which would “place certain criminal laws and
punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”219
The key question was whether Miller required sentencing courts
to simply consider a juvenile defendant’s age before sentencing him
or her to life without parole—a procedural modification—or did
Miller, in fact, dictate that states were constitutionally prohibited
from imposing the punishment—a substantive rule to be applied
retroactively.220
Finding Miller announced a substantive rule to be applied
retroactively, Justice Kennedy, writing for a narrowly divided
Court, relied upon his majority opinions in Roper and Graham,
calling them the “foundation stone for Miller’s analysis.”221 Justice
Kennedy clarified that Miller imposed not only a procedural
requirement that the sentencer give individualized consideration
to the circumstances of youth, but also placed a substantive
limitation upon juvenile life without parole sentences.222
217. See id. at 728 (defining a substantive rule as those “forbidding criminal
punishment of certain primary conduct” and those “prohibiting a certain category
of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense”).
218. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (limiting the scope of such
procedural rules to “those new procedures without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished”); see also Schriro v. Summerlin, 542
U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (defining watershed rules of criminal procedure as those
“implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding”).
219. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (focusing on the substantive rule
exception to the bar on retroactivity because the procedural change would not
affect the accuracy of any convictions).
220. See id. at 730 (“Even where procedural error has infected a trial, the
resulting conviction or sentence may still be accurate. . . . [T]he same
possibility . . . does not exist . . . where the Constitution immunizes the defendant
from the sentence imposed.”).
221. See id. at 732–33 (“Miller took as its starting premise the principle
established in Roper and Graham that ‘children are constitutionally different
from adults for the purposes of sentencing.”’ (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471)).
222. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (“Miller, then, did more than require
a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without
parole; it established that the penological justifications for life without parole
collapse in light of the ‘distinctive attributes of youth.”).
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Accordingly, Miller prohibited states from imposing the
punishment, not on all juveniles, but on all children “whose crime
reflects ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Because of his
lessened culpability as a juvenile offender, the Court found
“prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show
their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption.”223
The Court gave states the option to avoid resentencing by
simply permitting parole hearings for the Montgomery
prisoners.224 In doing so, the Court noted that this approach would
not burden the states and would maintain the finality of state
convictions.225However, if a state elected to pursue life without
parole sentence on resentencing, the Court reiterated that Miller
placed a ceiling on punishment for the vast majority of juveniles.226
Only based on a “properly informed finding that a child is the rare
juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that
rehabilitation is impossible” could a sentencer impose a life
without parole sentence.227 In other words, the question for a
sentencer was whether the offender’s crimes, committed as a
juvenile, “reflect transient immaturity” or “irreparable
corruption.”228
The Montgomery decision importantly expanded Miller to the
2,100 inmates who were already serving mandatory life without
parole sentences at the time Miller was announced.229 But it also
represented an interpretative expansion of Miller by clarifying
that Miller was meant as a categorical ban on the imposition of life
without parole sentences for a class of defendants, not based on a
clear delineator such as age, but on the basis of an amorphous
trait: irreparable corruption. In doing so, the Court did not define
irreparable corruption, except to provide a synonym—
223. Id. at 736.
224. Id. By Montgomery prisoners, I refer to those whose convictions that were
final prior to the Miller decision and for whom Montgomery allowed an avenue for
relief.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 733.
228. See id. at 734 (distinguishing Miller from Roper and Graham because
Miller actually drew a line between the rare, irreparably corrupt offender and the
majority of juveniles).
229. Id. at 736.
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“incorrigible”230—and an equally amorphous antonym—“those
whose crime reflects transient immaturity.”231 Nor did the Court
provide the states with any meaningful guidance on how they
should construct a proceeding, whether on initial sentencing or on
the resentencing required by Montgomery for those sentenced prior
to Miller, to determine whether a juvenile offender is irreparably
corrupt.232 Instead, the Montgomery decision foisted upon the state
courts the responsibility for interpreting and defining a standard,
and then setting up a procedure to make individual determinations
of whether offenders met the standard.233 To complicate matters,
the irreparable corruption standard being handed over to the
states to develop was based on the exact distinction, between
transient immaturity and irreparable corruption, that the Court
had in the death penalty context determined was too complex for
jurors because it was “difficult even for expert psychologists” to
distinguish between the two types of offenders.234
The confounding standard led Justice Scalia, in dissent, to
suggest that the majority was being disingenuous by even putting
this standard to the states. “The majority does not seriously expect
state and federal collateral-review tribunals to engage in this
silliness, probing the evidence of ‘incorrigibility’ that existed
decades ago when defendants were sentenced.”235 Instead, Scalia
asserted the Court’s true motive was found in its “not-so-subtle
invitation” to the states that they may avoid this resentencing
process by granting everyone affected parole eligibility: “This
whole exercise, this whole distortion of Miller is just a devious way
230. Id. at 734.
231. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
232. Cf. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (suggesting
that the evidence raised by Montgomery of his troubled youth, his achievements
in prison, and his efforts to mentor younger prisoners could be used to show
rehabilitation).
233. See id. at 735 (“We leave to the States the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.”).
234. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“If trained psychiatrists with the advantage
of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from
assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver
condemnation.”).
235. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the
particular problem of attempting to gauge an offender’s irreparableness at the
time of the crime when that offender has spent years in prison).
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of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders.”236 In
Scalia’s telling, the Court only stops short of saying so explicitly to
save face.237 Because the Court had relied upon the availability and
the severity of life without parole in striking down the juvenile
death penalty,238 it could not, a mere decade later, declare that
penalty to also be unconstitutionally disproportionate.239 Instead,
Justice Scalia posited the irreparable corruption standard as a
Godfather-like offer from the Court to the states: “Avoid all the
utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply
permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for
parole.”240 This, however, was clearly not an “offer they couldn’t
refuse,” as the response of many state legislatures has been to try
to define irreparable corruption, whatever it may mean.241
C. The Difficult Application of the Irreparable Corruption
Standard
In Roper, the Supreme Court specifically relied on the
difficulty of distinguishing between children whose crimes reflect
their transient immaturity and those whose crimes reflect
irreparable corruption as a justification for finding the juvenile
death penalty unconstitutional.242 What made the irreparable
corruption distinction an impermissible standard in death penalty
cases was that the Court would be asking judges and jurors to
make a distinction that “is difficult even for expert
psychologists.”243 However, in Miller and Montgomery, the Court
236. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744.
237. See id. (“The Court might have done that expressly . . . but that would
have been something of an embarrassment.”).
238. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (assuaging concerns about any lost deterrent
effect of striking down the juvenile death penalty by recognizing that juvenile life
without parole is itself a particularly severe penalty).
239. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“How could the
majority—in an opinion written by the very author of Roper—now say that
punishment is also unconstitutional? . . . [T]he Court refuses . . . today, but
merely makes imposition of that severe sanction a practical impossibility.”).
240. Id.
241. See infra Part III.C.2 (tracking the states’ responses to the Montgomery
decision).
242. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
243. Id.
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made this scientifically confounding distinction the threshold for
applying the harshest penalty available, a penalty banned as
unconstitutional for juveniles who did not meet this criteria.244
Thus, making a reliable factual determination about a juvenile
offender’s character is constitutionally significant, because
without such a finding a life without parole sentence is cruel and
unusual punishment.245
The Supreme Court has given little guidance since
Montgomery as to what and how a sentencer should determine
whether on a case-by-case basis an offender’s crime reflects
irreparable corruption.246 Montgomery made clear that the
sentencer had to do more than simply consider the mitigating
effects of youth, they had to make the factual determination that
the offender was irreparably corrupt.247
This Part will address both the difficulties that expert
psychologists face in determining whether a juvenile is irreparably
corrupt from the scientific angle.248 Then, this Part will provide an
overview of the practical difficulties states are having in
determining how to apply the irreparable corruption standard.249
1. Scientific Difficulties
One of the primary difficulties mentioned in Roper is that the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) forbids psychiatrists from
diagnosing antisocial personality disorders in patients under

244. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (finding those
whose crimes reflected transient immaturity protected from life without parole
sentences).
245. See id. (interpreting Miller’s substantive holding as a requirement that
sentencing courts limit life without parole sentences to those offenders whose
crimes reflect irreparable corruption).
246. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Court’s silence on Montgomery
cases still coming to the Court).
247. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (“Even if a court considers a child’s
age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates
the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity.”).
248. Infra Part III.C.1.
249. Infra Part III.C.2.
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eighteen.250 In Miller, the APA filed an amicus brief, in which they
stated that “[t]he positive predictive power of juvenile
psychotherapy assessments . . . remains poor.”251
The difficulty preventing expert psychiatrists from using their
clinical training to diagnose a juvenile with a personality disorder
is the same that makes the death penalty and mandatory life
without parole constitutionally impermissible: children’s brains
are not yet fully developed. “Adolescence is a period of substantial
brain maturation with respect to both structure and function.”252
Furthermore, adolescence involves “plasticity in brain maturation”
that is “qualitatively different from that of the adult.”253 The
general takeaway, for those who argue for a categorical ban on
juvenile life without parole sentences, is that because of the “rapid
change in brain processes during adolescence, who [these children]
will become as adults is not yet clear.”254 In other words, you cannot
determine whether a juvenile offender committed a crime because
of “transient immaturity” without seeing if he transitions out of
that immaturity.255 From a psychological perspective, because of
250. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“As we understand it, this difficulty underlies
the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as having
antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy or
sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for
the feelings, rights, and suffering of others.” (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTICS AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
701– 06 (4th ed. text rev. 2000))).
251. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646,
10-9647), 2012 WL 174239, at *21.
252. Steinberg, supra note 42, at 70.
253. See Beatriz Luna & Catherine Wright, Adolescent Brain Development:
Implications for the Juvenile Criminal Justice System, in APA HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 91, 110 (Kirk Heilbrun ed., 2016)
What neuroscience evidence can do is inform how adolescents
constitute a special population with respect to culpability and extended
sentencing. In regard to culpability, immaturities in the adolescent
brain can provide evidence that the defendant may have acted in an
impulsive and impassioned manner that might not have occurred had
that individual reached full maturity with optimal executive control
and dampened motivational reactivity.
254. Id. at 109.
255. See Robert Semel, Limitations of Extending Juvenile Psychopathy
Research Assessment Tools and Methods to Forensic Settings, 4 J. PSYCHOL. &
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the continued possibility for further brain development, a clinician
cannot make a determination regarding whether a juvenile
offender is in fact irreparably corrupt.256 This makes the states’
implementation of an irreparable corruption standard nearly
impossible, as psychiatric diagnoses—the best evidence—are
prohibited by the APA due to their unreliability.
2. Procedural Difficulties in the States
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a number of cases
seeking guidance on the directives of Miller and Montgomery.257
Without any further instruction, some states have taken steps
legislatively to convert the sentences of those serving mandatory
life without parole sentence into parole-eligible sentences.258 Other
states have left the resentencing process largely up to their courts
to figure out.259
This considerable confusion has led to splits in the state courts
related to three primary issues. The first area of confusion stems
from the question of when the Miller/Montgomery protections are
triggered. State courts are split as to whether to apply
Miller/Montgomery to only mandatory sentencing schemes or to
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2015) (showing that “most individuals identified as
psychopaths at age 13 will not receive such a diagnosis at age 24”).
256. Id.
257. See Johnson v. Idaho, 395 P.3d 1246 (Idaho 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct.
470 (2017) (mem.) (denying without opinion petition for writ of certiorari urging
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juveniles); see also Adams v.
Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 1796, 1799 – 1801 (2016) (mem.) (granted, vacated, and
remanded) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (supplying that a life without parole
sentence cannot be based simply on the serious or shocking nature of the offense);
Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 11–13 (2016) (mem.) (granted, vacated, and
remanded) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (clarifying Miller/Montgomery as
requiring a finding that the “crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility”).
258. See generally Associated Press, A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life
Without
Parole,
ASSOC.
PRESS
(July
31,
2017),
https://apnews.com/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85 (last visited Dec. 2,
2018) (presenting the number of inmates serving life without parole sentences,
the number resentenced or released, and the legislative remedies of each state)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
259. Id.; see also Kimberly Thomas, Random If Not Rare: The Eighth
Amendment Weaknesses of Post-Miller Legislation, 68 S.C. L. REV. 393, 401–11
(2017) (summarizing state responses to Miller).
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extend the protections to those who received discretionary life
without parole sentences.260 For example, the Arizona Supreme
Court initially denied review on a case that applied Miller only to
mandatory sentences.261 But after the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded a number of Arizona cases for reconsideration in light of
Montgomery,262 the court reversed course.263 The Virginia Supreme
Court similarly had its decision finding Miller only applied to
mandatory sentences vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Montgomery.264 However, that court remained steadfast
that Miller/Montgomery only applied to mandatory life without
parole sentences.265 An ancillary dispute among the courts exists
over whether Miller/Montgomery protections apply to only “life
without parole” sentences or more expansively to include de facto
life without parole sentences—aggregated sentences that deny the
prisoner any meaningful opportunity for release.266
A second, and more applicable, disagreement exists over
whether Montgomery even requires a finding of irreparable
corruption.267 This dispute stems from the language of
260. For an appendix listing the various state court approaches to this
question, see Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State
Responses, the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban
on Life Without Parole for Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149,194 (2017).
261. State v. Purcell, No. CA-CR 13-0614 PRPC, 2015 WL 2453192, at *1
(Ariz. Ct. App. May 21, 2015), review denied (Ariz. Jan. 5, 2016), vacated, 137 S.
Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.).
262. Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11 (2016) (mem.).
263. See State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016) (applying
Montgomery to juvenile sentenced to life after the abolition of parole, who was not
eligible for earned release credits, even where the legislature had later amended
the statute to allow for the opportunity for release).
264. Jones v. Virginia, 136 S. Ct. 1358 (2016) (mem.).
265. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 713 (Va. 2017) (finding a
juvenile’s statutorily prescribed life sentence in a state without parole was not
mandatory because judges had the discretion to suspend any part of the sentence).
266. For a more comprehensive list of how state courts have decided this
issue, see Hoesterey, supra note 260, at 195–97, App. D.
267. Compare Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding a
finding of permanent incorrigibility/irreparable corruption is required); Davis v.
State, 415 P.3d 666, 695 (Wyo. 2018) (same); People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849,
863 (Ill. 2017) (same); Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 468 (Fla. 2016) (same);
Veal v. State 784 S.E.2d 403, 410 (Ga. 2016) (same); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956,
963 n.11 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016) (same); with United States v. Briones, 890 F.3d
811, 819 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding no requirement that courts make an explicit
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Montgomery, specifically the Court’s acknowledgment that “Miller
did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a
child’s incorrigibility.”268 Based on this sentence, some courts have
construed Miller/Montgomery as merely requiring consideration of
the factors of youth269 or reaffirming the need for proportionality
review of sentences.270 However, as other courts have rightly
pointed out, Montgomery also charges sentencing authorities with
the duty of “separat[ing] those juveniles who may be sentenced to
life without parole from those who may not.”271 Furthermore, recall
that the central holding of Montgomery was that Miller created a
substantive rule that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
imposition of life without parole sentences on a class of
offenders—those juvenile offenders whose crimes did not reflect
irreparable corruption.272 The Court mentions eight times that
only irreparably corrupt juveniles can receive life without parole
sentences.273 While the split over this question highlights the
degree of confusion caused by the Montgomery opinion, the case for
the existence of the irreparable corruption is on safe ground.
finding that juvenile offenders are irreparably corrupt); People v. Skinner 917
N.W.2d 292, 308 (Mich. 2018) (same); Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 69 (Miss.
2018) (same); Johnson v. State, 395 P.3d 1246, 1258 (Idaho 2017) (same); State v.
Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016) (same).
268. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016). But see id.
That this finding is not required, however, speaks only to the degree of
procedure Miller mandated in order to implement its substantive
guarantee. When a new substantive rule of constitutional law is
established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant
procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon
the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems.
269. See Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 69 (reaffirming its pre-Montgomery decision
that Miller only required sentencing authorities to take into account
characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles) (citing Jones v. State, 122
So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013)).
270. See Skinner, N.W.2d at 309–310 (“In this sense, the ‘irreparable
corruption’ standard is analogous to the proportionality standard that applies to
all criminal sentences.”).
271. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735; see also id. at 734 (“Miller, then, did more
than require a sentence to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing
life without parole . . . .”).
272. Id. at 733–34.
273. See Hoesterey, supra note 260, at 173 n.189 (listing the eight separate
sentences in the Montgomery opinion in which the Court highlights the
importance of a finding of irreparable corruption).
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Other courts have found application of the irreparable
corruption standard unconstitutional.The Supreme Courts of
Iowa, Massachusetts, and Washington all found that because
distinguishing between the two cannot be done with accuracy or
integrity, the imposition of life without parole sentences on
juveniles would violate the states’ constitutions.274 In doing so,
theses courts grappled with the same Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and the scientific data on brain science development
in adolescence presented to the Supreme Court in Miller and
Montgomery and concluded the irreparably corrupt standard was
unworkable.275
The Iowa Supreme Court framed its review as determining
whether to develop case law around this new irreparable
corruption standard by proceeding on a case-by-case basis or
taking a categorical approach, banning life without parole
sentences under the state constitution.276 The court reviewed the
case law development leading to Montgomery and concluded that
identifying which juvenile offenders are “irretrievable” at the time
of trial would be “too speculative and likely impossible given what
we know about the timeline of brain development.”277 If “trained
professionals with years of clinical experience would not attempt
274. See State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 838 (Iowa 2016) (“Because of the
difficulty of applying the individual Miller factors, the likelihood that the
multifactor test can be consistently applied by our district courts is doubtful at
best.”); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283 – 85
(Mass. 2013) (“Simply put, because the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed,
either structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with
confidence that a particular offender, at that point in time is irretrievably
depraved.”); State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 354 (Wash. 2018) (“[G]iven the
difficulty even expert psychologists have in determining whether a person is
irreparably corrupt and the extremely high stakes of the decision . . . this type of
discretion produces the unacceptable risk that children undeserving of a life
without parole sentence will receive one.”).
275. See Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 811 (reviewing a psychologist testimony that
because of Sweet’s adolescence it was not possible to determine if he would
develop a “full-blown psychopathic personality disorder as an adult, and even if
he did, psychologists could not say whether it would be untreatable”); Diatchenko,
1 N.E.3d at 283–84 (“Given current scientific research on adolescent brain
development, and the myriad significant ways that this development impacts a
juvenile’s personality and behavior, a conclusive showing of traits such as an
‘irretrievably depraved character’ can never be made with integrity . . . .”).
276. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 835–37.
277. Id. at 836–37.
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to make such a determination,” the court found that “no structural
or
procedural
approach,
including
provision
of
a
death-penalty-type legal defense, [would] cure this fundamental
problem.”278
The court’s rejection was two-fold. First, the court found that
the factors suggested by Miller for consideration such as the
offender’s family and home environment, or history of abuse could
cut either way in a sentencer’s determination.279 The ambiguous
results and the known information about adolescent brain
development convinced the court that it could not impose an
irreparable corruption standard and hope for accurate or fair
application.280 Second, any attempt to fairly determine who was
the irreparably corrupt juvenile offender would require the use of
death-penalty-type safeguards, such as expert testimony and
extensive resources, and even as such the determinations would be
constitutionally inadequate under the state constitution.281
On the other side are the states that, upon review, have
preserved juvenile life without parole sentences and attempted to
craft procedural rules to ensure the constitutionality of the
proceedings.282 Pennsylvania stands as a particularly poignant
example of the struggle states have had crafting a procedure for
determining which offenders meet the irreparable corruption
standard. At the time of Miller, Pennsylvania had more juveniles

278. Id. at 837.
279. See id. at 838 (“Would the fact that the adolescent offender failed to
benefit from a comparatively positive home environment suggest he or she is
irreparable . . . or . . . suggest that his or her character and personality have not
been irreparably damaged and prospects for rehabilitation are . . . greater?”).
280. See id. at 838 (“Because of the difficulty of applying the individual Miller
factors, the likelihood that the multifactor test can be consistently applied by our
district courts is doubtful at best.”).
281. See id. at 837
In imposing a sanction akin to the death penalty in some respects, the
trial court simply will not have adequate information and the risk of
error is unacceptably high, even if we require an intensive, highly
structured inquiry similar to that required by the ABA guidelines for
the defense of death-penalty cases.
282. See State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Mo. 2013) (placing the burden on
the state to make a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
irreparably corrupt); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (fashioning
rules for Pennsylvania, in lieu of state legislative action).
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serving life without parole than any other state283 and is one of only
three states with over one hundred juveniles yet to be
resentenced.284 In Commonwealth v. Batts,285 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania recognized a presumption against the imposition
of life without parole for juvenile offenders and placed the burden
on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender
was incapable of rehabilitation.286 The court was asked to review
the resentencing of a Montgomery prisoner, convicted and
sentenced prior to Miller. The trial court considered a litany of
information, including expert testimony, and found Batts to be
irreparably corrupt and resentenced Batts to life without parole.287
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed that finding and set
up the procedural framework for the other resentencings.288
The Batts decision is especially intriguing because of its
treatment of the Pennsylvania lower court’s consideration of
expert testimony presented by the Commonwealth.289 Dr. Michals,
a forensic psychiatrist testified that, based on his review of an
examination and psychological testing conducted by the
defendant’s expert, Batts’s personality would not change and that
his impulsiveness, poor judgment, and “acting out behavior” were
“just unfortunately part of who he is,” part of his “biological genetic

283. See JUVENILE SENTENCING PROJECT AT QUINNIPIAC UNIV. SCH. OF LAW &
THE VITAL PROJECTS FUND, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE
UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 2017 SNAPSHOT, https://www.juvenilelwop.org/wp-

content/uploads/November%202017%20Snapshot%20of%20JLWOP%20Sentence
s%2011.20.17.pdf (noting that Pennsylvania had approximately 525 juveniles
serving life without parole at the time of Miller while Michigan and Louisiana
had 363 and 290, respectively).
284. See id. (noting that Pennsylvania has 325 mandatory resentencings
remaining; prosecutors in Michigan and Louisiana have elected to pursue life
without parole sentences in resentencing hearings for 229 and 112 inmates,
respectively).
285. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 418 (Pa. 2017) (presenting
the procedural history).
286. Id.
287. See id. at 426 (recounting the trial court’s finding that the aggravating
factors significantly outweighed the mitigating factors).
288. See id. at 460 (reversing the trial court).
289. See id. at 438–39 (rejecting the psychiatrist’s testimony as directly in
opposition to the legal conclusions of the Supreme Court and the science backing
those conclusions).
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makeup.”290 The expert did note that he could not predict the
future and that Batts had not received any psychological treatment
or counseling in prison, but he believed that people generally do
not change as they age.291 Batts presented his own expert, who
testified on the role Batts’s horrible environment played in
creating his situation, and that he believed with therapy, Batts
would be able to change.292 However, the trial court, in
resentencing Batts to life without parole made reference to the
defense experts’ belief that “any rehabilitation will require years
of psychotherapy” as a grounds for finding Batts to be among the
irreparably corrupt.293
In overturning the lower court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania pointed out that the sentencing court had relied
upon Dr. Michals’s testimony to decide that Batts was not capable
of rehabilitation, but “the testimony and conclusions espoused by
Dr. Michals are in direct opposition to the legal conclusion
announced by the High Court and the facts (scientific studies)
underlying it.”294 In part, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed the sentencing court’s decision because the expert
testimony was just plain wrong.295 However, the Supreme Court
rejected Batts’s argument that expert testimony be required for a
court to make a determination that the defendant is irreparable.296
The court believed that placing a presumption against the sentence
and requiring the prosecution to prove permanent incorrigibility
beyond a reasonable doubt would likely necessitate expert

290. Id. at 422.
291. Id. at 425.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id. at 438 (reminding the lower courts that when the U.S. Supreme
Court issues a decision, they are bound not only by the result, “but also by those
portions of the opinion necessary to that result”).
295. See id. at 438–39 (“Dr. Michals’ testimony therefore does not constitute
competent evidence and cannot provide support for a conclusion that Batts’s
actions were not the result of transient immaturity or that he is permanently
incorrigible.”).
296. See id. at 455–56 (declining to hold that expert testimony is
constitutionally required to rebut the presumption against permanent
incorrigibility and leaving it to the sentencing courts to determine the necessity).
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IV. The Link between Life Without Parole and Death Penalty
Jurisprudence
Prior to Graham, the Supreme Court often opined in the
context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that “death is
different.”298 After Graham, at least one commentator has
identified a new “kids are different” jurisprudence arising at the
intersection of death penalty cases and juvenile life without parole
cases.299 Professor Mary Berkheiser described the Court’s use in
Graham of an analytical approach previously reserved for death
penalty cases as “unceremoniously demolish[ing] the Hadrian’s
Wall that has separated its ‘death is different’ jurisprudence from
non-capital sentencing review from 1972.”300 Professor Berkheiser
suggests that “[i]n its place the Court fortified an expansive ‘kids
are different’ jurisprudence.”301
For the first time in Graham the Court applied the legal
reasoning that was previously reserved for death penalty cases to
a case outside of the capital context.302 Recognizing that life
without parole is “the second most severe penalty permitted by
law,” the Court said that while death is “unique in its severity and
irrevocability . . . life without parole sentences share some
characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other
sentences.”303 The Court, thus, linked capital punishment with life
297. See also id. at 460 – 61 (Wecht, J., concurring) (suggesting that expert
testimony should be utilized by the State in almost all resentencings and that,
where it is, the defendant should also be entitled to an expert in the interest of
equity).
298. See Thomas, supra note 259, at 397.
299. See Berkheiser, supra note 157, at 1 (articulating the real impact of
Graham as the sea change to the Court’s use of its Eighth Amendment legal
reasoning).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (addressing
Graham’s case under an analytical framework previously saved for death penalty
jurisprudence).
303. Id. at 69.
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without parole sentences in their irrevocability: “The State does
not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the
sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.
It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving
hope of restoration.”304 For juvenile defendants, the Court
reasoned, life without parole “means denial of hope; it means that
good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind
and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his
days.”305 In effect, by reaching into its capital jurisprudence, the
Court was opening a Pandora’s box —enabling litigants to use the
Eighth Amendment to pursue limits on noncapital sentencing.306
Before Graham, the Court had only ever used the Eighth
Amendment to apply a categorical ban on sentences in capital
cases, never in sentences of imprisonment.307 With Graham,
Miller, and Montgomery, the Court definitively expanded the
limitations on sentencing provided by the Eighth Amendment into
the realm of juvenile life without parole sentences.308 While the
Court has yet to push further in applying its Eighth Amendment
limitations, it is clear, at least, that the Court wanted state courts
to revisit their imposition of life without parole sentences on
juvenile offenders. In order to interpret the Eighth Amendment
procedural restriction on the state courts in Montgomery—the
requirement that state courts find a juvenile offender irreparably
corrupt before sentencing them to life without parole—it makes
sense that we should look for guidance in the only area to which
Eighth Amendment analysis had, until Graham, been
applied—death penalty jurisprudence.

304. Id. at 69– 70.
305. Id. at 72 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).
306. See Russell & Denholtz, supra note 162, at 1124 (advocating for the use
of Eighth Amendment challenges in noncapital sentencing contexts to push for
better sentencing procedures for both juvenile and adult offenders).
307. See id. at 1125 (“In reviewing the constitutionality of noncapital
sentences, the Court considered whether the sentence was ‘grossly
disproportionate’ as applied to the offense and the offender.”).
308. See id. at 1125–26 (explaining the expansion of the death penalty
framework to the juvenile life without parole context).
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V. Applying the Lessons of Death Penalty Jurisprudence
As in Montgomery, when the Supreme Court in Atkins v.
Virginia309 drew an Eighth Amendment line mandating those with
intellectual disabilities could not be executed, it left to the states
how to implement this requirement.310 In Montgomery, the Court
in effect told the states there was a class of offenders—juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth—who were constitutionally protected from the most severe
available punishment—life without parole.311 In Atkins, the Court
similarly told the states there was a class of offenders—the
intellectually disabled—who were constitutionally protected from
the most severe available punishment—death.312 In both Atkins
and Montgomery, the Court, in an effort to avoid overstepping its
federalism bounds, gave state courts and sentencers a clear order
that certain offenders were exempt from certain punishments, but
gave little substantive guidance as to how the sentencer should
determine who fell into the protected categories.313
Luckily, for state courts and sentencers baffled as to who is
and is not “irreparably corrupt” the Supreme Court was forced in
the years following Atkins to refine the boundaries of what states
can and cannot do to determine which offenders are “intellectually
disabled.”314 The guidance in these subsequent decisions can also
309. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
310. Id. at 317.
311. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (stating a
different and more protective standard must apply to juveniles when considering
a sentence of life without parole).
312. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that execution of the “mentally
retarded” is excessive and violative of the Eighth Amendment).
313. Compare id. at 317 (“[W]e leave to the States the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction.”) (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986))), with Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735
When a new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this
Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural
requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the State’s
sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems. . . . [W]e
leave to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction.
314. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014) (rejecting Florida’s scheme
for determining intellectually disabled); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052– 53
(2017) (rejecting Texas’s scheme for determining intellectually disabled).
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provide guidance as to how state courts should determine the
meaning of irreparable corruption and what kinds of evidence are
persuasive, or perhaps even required, to make such a finding.
A. Looking to the Atkins Line of Cases for Guidance on Defining
an Amorphous Standard
Daryl Atkins was sentenced to death for committing a
robbery-murder with an accomplice.315 At sentencing, his defense
relied upon the testimony of a forensic psychologist who testified
that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded.”316 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to revisit its prior decision in Penry v.
Lynaugh317 holding that the Constitution did not bar the execution
of intellectually disabled defendants.318 The Court undertook the
familiar Eighth Amendment analysis and found that a national
consensus had emerged against executing the intellectually
disabled, as evidenced by the number of states that had taken
legislative action to prohibit such sentences and the few executions
being carried out in those states that maintained the penalty on
the books.319
The Court then turned to consider whether the penological
purposes of the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—were
served by executing the intellectually disabled.320 The Court
concluded that intellectually disabled offenders’ diminished
capacities “do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions,
but they do diminish their personal culpability.”321 As it would
315. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
316. Id. at 308 – 09. Atkins had an IQ of 59 and a mental age of a child between
the age of nine and twelve-years-old. Id. While Atkins used the term mental
retardation, the courts, and popular nomenclature, have since referred to
intellectual disability. As used in this Note, the terms are interchangeable.
317. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
318. See id. at 340 (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar the
execution of “any mentally retarded person”).
319. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (acknowledging the judgment of the
legislatures and noting that the Court has no reason to disagree with that
judgment).
320. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (questioning whether
any justification for the death penalty applies to “mentally retarded offenders”).
321. Id. at 318.
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later state with regard to juveniles, the Court found this
diminished culpability sufficient to undermine the retribution
rationale because an offender with diminished culpability for their
crime could not be considered among the worst of the worst for
whom the most severe penalty was reserved.322 The Court pointed
out that these same cognitive and behavioral impairments that
lessened culpability also made these offenders less able to
comprehend the possibility of death as a penalty and adjust their
conduct accordingly.323
The Atkins decision diverged from many of the Court’s
previous Eighth Amendment reviews in that it bestowed on the
states the power and obligation to define the class of defendants
exempted from punishment by giving meaning to the term
intellectually disabled.324 Past death penalty exemptions for
classes of offenders were based on clear delineations such as age325
or offense.326 The only exception until Atkins was Ford v.
Wainwright,327 in which the Court, finding the Eighth Amendment
barred the execution of the mentally insane, explicitly left it up to
the states to determine a procedure for deciding whether a

322. See id. at 319 (concluding that the retribution rationale for the death
penalty was not fulfilled by executing intellectually disabled offenders).
323. See id. at 320 (listing among these impairments: “the diminished ability
to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, or to control impulses”).
324. See id. at 317 (“To the extent there is serious disagreement about the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are
in fact retarded. . . . [Thus] we leave to the States the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction . . . .”); but see Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986) (recognizing an already in-practice ban
on executing the mentally insane and preserving the state’s rights to continue to
determine the procedure for deciding whether a defendant was insane or not).
325. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (barring the death
penalty for defendants under age sixteen at the time of the offense).
326. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420–21 (2008) (barring the
death penalty for child rape); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(barring the death penalty for accomplice without intent to kills in felony murder);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (barring the death penalty for adult
rape).
327. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (recognizing an
already in-practice ban on executing the mentally insane and preserving the
state’s rights to continue to determine the procedure for deciding whether a
defendant was insane or not).
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defendant met a mental insanity standard.328 Significantly, at the
time of the Ford decision, no state actually allowed for the
execution of the insane, so each state already had a procedure in
place for its determination of whether a capital defendant belonged
to this constitutionally protected class.329 The Court in Ford was
not directing the states to develop wholecloth a new standard to
define mental insanity, but rather recognizing that the states
existent definitions would suffice.
Atkins differed in that the constitutionally protected class it
exempted did not have readily discernible members and the Court
was telling the states to define intellectually disabled for
themselves to determine who could and could not be executed.330
By not establishing a bright-line rule, the Court delegated this task
to the states with only the instruction that their standards would
be constitutional so long as they “generally conformed” to the
clinical definitions then in existence331—one set forth by the
American Association on Intellectual and Development
Disabilities (AAIDD)332 and a virtually identical definition
provided by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in its
Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-V).
The clinical definitions looked to three distinct aspects of an
individual’s deficits to make a determination of intellectual
disability. First, the sentencer would look to the defendant’s
“intellectual functioning deficits,” typically by using an IQ test.333
328. See id. at 416–17 (“[W]e leave to the State the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of
sentences.”).
329. See id. at 408 n.2 (reviewing the fifty states’ existent approaches to
determining who constitutes an insane offender).
330. See id. at 317 (“Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be
so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom
there is a national consensus [regarding ineligibility for the death penalty].”).
331. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n. 22 (2002) (noting that the
statutory definitions of mental retardation already in use by states who had
banned the death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders were not identical
but generally conform to the clinical definitions).
332. The AAIDD was formerly known, and cited to in Atkins, as the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR).
333. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].

SENTENCE FOR THE DAMNED

2197

A defendant would meet the intellectual functioning deficit prong
by scoring “approximately two standard deviations or more below
the population mean” with room for a standard margin of error—
an IQ in the range of 65–75.334 Second, the clinical definition looked
to adaptive skill deficits.335 An impairment in any of three
categories of adaptive deficits—conceptual, social, and
practical— would be sufficient to meet the adaptive skills prong.336
Clinicians based these determinations upon “knowledgeable
informants . . . [and] educational, developmental, medical, and
mental health evaluations.”337 Finally, the third prong required
that a defendant’s intellectual and adaptive deficits manifested at
some point before the age of eighteen.338
However, as in Montgomery, the Court’s delegation to the
states to determine the meaning of intellectual disability created
confusion and wide variation in the resulting standards.339 By
adopting clinical, rather than legal definitions, two problems arose.
First, some states adopted additional requirements making the IQ
requirements more restrictive (quantitative restrictions) or
providing additional interpretive guidance for the adaptive prong
(qualitative restrictions).340 Second, the clinical diagnoses did not
match up well to criminal culpability.341 The result of both
problems was underinclusive definitions of intellectual disability,
leaving otherwise constitutionally protected individuals
334. Id.
335. See id. (requiring “deficits in adaptive function that result in a failure to
meet developmental and socio-cultural standards for personal independence and
social responsibility”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (including communication,
self-care, and self-direction in this analysis).
336. Clinton M. Barker, Substantial Guidance without Substantive Guides:
Resolving the Requirements of Moore v. Texas and Hall v. Florida, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 1027, 1037 (2017).
337. DSM-5, supra note 333, at 33, 37.
338. See id. at 41 (setting the age-of-onset cutoff at eighteen to ensure the
deficits occurred sometime during the developmental period).
339. See John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 689, 693 (2009) (“This troubling array allows a defendant who would be
ineligible for execution in one state to be eligible for execution in another.”).
340. Barker, supra note 336, at 1037–38.
341. See id. (noting how the importation of clinical definitions into the legal
realm assured continuing disagreement over the definition of intellectually
disabled).
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susceptible to capital punishment.342 In other words, those who
would meet the “intellectually disabled” criteria in one state would
be eligible for execution in another state simply based upon the
state’s diverging approaches to applying the clinical definition.343
States had to make a number of determinations in setting up
a procedure for deciding which death row defendants were
intellectually disabled or not.344 Should a judge or jury decide? Who
would bear the burden of proof and what standard of proof would
be required to show the defendant was intellectually disabled?
According to Professor John Blume, these decisions contributed to
the likelihood that an offender would be found to meet the
definition of intellectually disabled.345 His research showed that
from 2002 to 2014 where the jury was tasked with the
determination, only 4% of defendants were found to be
intellectually disabled compared to a 43% success rate for Atkins
claims overall.346
The success rates of Atkins claims varied significantly by
state.347 For example, Alabama, a state which applied a strict IQ
cutoff and assessed adaptive functioning deficits based on what the
claimant could do, as opposed to (as the clinical definition required)
focusing on the claimants limitations, rejected 88% of Atkins
claims, whereas North Carolina, which did not apply such a
restrictive definition of intellectual disability found 80% of
claimants met the definition of intellectually disabled.348 Overall,
Blume found that success rates were lower in states that had

342. Id.
343. See Blume et al., supra note 339, at 693 (“This troubling array allows a
defendant who would be ineligible for execution in one state to be eligible for
execution in another.”).
344. See John Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins:
Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years after the Supreme
Court’s Creation of a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 410 (2014)
(assessing the success rates of claims in jurisdictions adopting different
procedures for Atkins hearings).
345. See id. (considering various factors and their effects upon Atkins claim
success rates).
346. See id. at 410–11 (noting the added discrepancy that jurors are typically
found to show greater leniency, especially in death penalty cases).
347. Id.
348. See id. at 412 (displaying disparities in successful Atkins claims by state).
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substantively deviated from the clinical definitions mentioned in
Atkins as the lodestar for determining intellectual disability.349
Texas and Florida were two of the states that deviated the
most from Atkins advice to follow the clinical definition.350 As a
result, before 2014, Florida had not found any defendant met its
definition of intellectually disabled, and Texas, with the largest
number of Atkins claims at forty-five, had only found eight
defendants to be intellectually disabled under that state’s rigorous
standard.351 While most states post-Atkins adopted the clinical
definitions outright, Texas and Florida used the room provided by
the Supreme Court’s statement that it would leave to the states
the creation of procedural rules to “enforce the constitutional
restriction” to apply methods that were far more restrictive.352 By
doing so, these states excluded from the constitutionally protected
class persons whom no reasonable clinician would exclude from a
pool of subjects with intellectual disability.
In Florida, the courts applied a strict cutoff—if a defendant’s
IQ was above 70, even if it was 71 or within the margin of error,
then his claim would be dismissed without even considering his
adaptive functioning deficits or age of onset, the second and third
prongs of the clinical definition.353 The clinical definition referred
to in Atkins recognized room for standard error, but the Florida
courts would only go deeper into a defendant’s deficits if the IQ
score fell at or below 70.354 The result was that a Florida defendant
whose full scale IQ scores, providing a range rather than a
snapshot, were between 68 and 86 could be executed, but a
349. See id. at 414 (“Florida and Alabama are in that category, as both of them
(prior to Hall) adhered to an IQ cutoff. Texas also deviates greatly, having adopted
its own idiosyncratic approach to adaptive functioning.”).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 412–14.
352. Blume et al., supra note 339, at 691.
353. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 714 (Fla. 2007) (disqualifying a
defendant with an IQ score of 72, even though it was within the standard error of
measurement for qualifying under the IQ prong of Atkins).
354. Compare DSM-5, supra note 333, at 37 (finding an individual meets the
intellectual prong of intellectual disability by scoring “approximately two
standard deviations or more below the population mean, including a margin for
measurement error,” or between 65 and 75), with Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 713
(interpreting the statute defining intellectual disability as providing a threshold
cutoff at 70).
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California defendant with scores of 81 to 96 could not because the
California courts adhered to the clinical definition and treated the
Atkins prongs in totality.355
Texas, on the other hand, imposed qualitative restrictions by
adding additional interpretative guidance to how sentencers
should understand the adaptive functioning prong.356 Texas added
seven factors (the so-called Briseno factors) to the three-prong
clinical test: (1) whether others thought the defendant was
intellectually disabled, (2) whether the defendant formulated and
carried through with plans, (3) whether the defendant’s conduct
showed leadership, (4) whether the defendant’s conduct in
response to external stimuli was rational, (5) whether the
defendant could respond to questions coherently, (6) whether the
defendant could hide facts and lie effectively, and (7) whether the
crime required forethought or complex execution.357 By adding
these questions, Texas directed the adaptive prong inquiry not to
the defendant’s adaptive deficits, but to his strengths.358 So while
the clinical definition recognized that a defendant could have
certain adaptive strengths, for example he could lie effectively but
still have intellectual disability,359 Texas would reject an Atkins
claim so long as the defendant showed a strength in that one
adaptive field.360
Over a decade after Atkins, the Supreme Court finally weighed
in on this underinclusiveness problem in states’ definitions of
intellectual disability. In Hall v. Florida,361 the Supreme Court
invalidated Florida’s use of the threshold IQ score, finding it

355. See Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v.
Virginia, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1231 (2008) (“[A]s the comparison between
Florida’s and California’s use of standardized IQ tests suggests, there are
noteworthy inconsistencies in the ways in which state courts are using these
tests.”).
356. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (describing
the additional requirements).
357. Id. at 8–9.
358. Stephen Greenspan, The Briseno Factors, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 219, 219 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
359. DSM-5, supra note 333, at 33, 38.
360. Greenspan, supra note 358.
361. 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
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inconsistent with Atkins.362 The Court emphasized that the clinical
definitions were a “fundamental premise of Atkins.”363 In affirming
its intention that the states abide by the clinical definition, the
Court reminded the states that they do not have complete
autonomy to define intellectual disability but rather should view
Atkins as providing “substantial guidance on the definition of
intellectual disability.”364 The Court seemed to warn the
noncompliant states to adopt the clinical definition without edits,
or risk being continually reversed. However, because of the
federalism concerns inherent in the Eighth Amendment
punishment questions, the Court couched its instructions in terms
of “substantial guidance on the definition.”365 The Sixth Circuit has
supported this interpretation, claiming that Hall instructs the
courts that “[s]ociety relies upon medical and professional
expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental
condition at issue.”366
The Court gave a similar directive in Moore v. Texas,367
invalidating Texas’s use of the Briseno factors.368 “Not aligned with
the medical community’s information, and drawing no strength
from our precedent, the Briseno factors create an unacceptable risk
that persons with intellectual disabilities will be executed.”369
Drawing further upon the medical community, the Court chastised
Texas’s many departures from clinical practice in requiring the
defendant to show his adaptive deficits were not related to a

362. See id. at 719 (“The Atkins Court twice cited definitions of intellectual
disability which, by their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at
70.”).
363. Id.
364. See id. at 720 (“If the States were to have complete autonomy to define
intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins could become
a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not
become a reality.”).
365. Id. at 721; see also Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 612 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“In Hall, the Court reasoned that the Constitution requires the courts and
legislatures to follow clinical practices in defining intellectual disability.”).
366. Van Tran, 764 F.3d at 612.
367. 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
368. See id. at 1044 (holding Texas’s scheme for determining intellectual
disability impermissible restrictive).
369. Id.
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personality disorder370 and in focusing on adaptive strengths
rather than adaptive deficits.371 Repeating its refrain from Hall,
the Court notes that the states have “some flexibility, but not
unfettered discretion in enforcing Atkins’s holding.”372 However,
the Court quickly supplied that the medical community’s current
standards constrain the states’ flexibility here because they reflect
the “best available description of how mental disorders are
expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians.”373 With the
emphasis upon the medical community and the most current
standards as a check upon the state’s control in determining the
meaning of intellectual disability, the Court further hints at a
requirement to bind close to the clinical experts because of a
recognition that they know best in this particular field.
B. Applying the Lessons of Atkins
By expanding the modern Eighth Amendment analysis to the
juvenile life without parole cases, the Supreme Court has arguably
either broken wide open its “death is different” jurisprudence, or
perhaps, more conservatively, has linked it together with a “kids
are different” approach. Further, the Court’s treatment of juvenile
offenders is inextricably linked to its treatment of intellectually
disabled offenders in Atkins because they are both based on the
lessened culpability from diminished capacity. Recognizing that
link, how does the Court’s reentry into the discussion of how to
define intellectually disabled offenders in Hall and Moore help
lower courts struggling to define the similarly amorphous
irreparable corruption standard?
The Supreme Court in both the Atkins and Montgomery
context is caught in the crossfire between respecting the states’
administration of their criminal justice systems and an

370. See id. at 1051 (“As mental health professionals recognize, however,
many intellectually disabled people also have other mental or physical
impairments.”).
371. See id. at 1050 (“But the medical community focuses the
adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”).
372. Id. at 1053.
373. See id. (quoting DSM-5, at xli).
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increasingly scientifically-based understanding of who the Eighth
Amendment protects from society’s harshest punishments.
In Atkins, the Supreme Court attempted to toe this line by
leaving to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction,” while explicitly citing the
clinical definition in its discussion of why an intellectually disabled
offender has diminished personal culpability and is therefore
constitutionally protected from execution.374 However, by not
explicitly requiring states to look to the clinical definition, the
Supreme Court opened the door to states like Texas and Florida to
essentially nullify Atkins by warping the clinical definition
through the addition of quantitative or qualitative restrictions to
the point that the assessment of whether an individual defendant
was intellectually disabled no longer bore out the clinical
underpinnings.375 States were, thus, able to ignore what the
leading psychiatrists and clinicians had to say in favor of their own
restrictive ideas of what intellectual disability looked like.
Most tellingly, Texas, in setting out its restrictive definition,
explicitly pitted the clinical definition of intellectual disability
against Lennie, a fictional intellectually disabled character in John
Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men.376 In adding its seven additional
factors to the adaptive functioning prong,377—factors that would
save the fictional Lennie but none of the men on Texas’s death row
who met the clinical definition of intellectually disabled—Texas

374. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (referencing the clinical
definitions intellectual and adaptive functioning prongs as they relate to
diminished relative culpability).
375. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 707 (2014) (rejecting Florida’s hard
cut-off IQ); Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53 (rejecting the Briseno factors).
376. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
Most Texas citizens might agree that Steinbeck’s Lennie should, by
virtue of his lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills, be
exempt. . . . But does a consensus of Texas citizens agree that all
persons who might legitimately qualify for assistance under the social
services definition of mental retardation be exempt from an otherwise
constitutional penalty?
377. See id. at 8 (setting out additional qualitative factors to be considered in
assessing adaptive deficits).
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rejected the expertise of professional psychologists in favor of this
“Lennie Standard.”378
This danger of courts dismissing a scientific standard in favor
of what they feel to be an appropriate definition threatens to play
out in the Montgomery context. To avoid the development of a
Lennie-like standard, courts should heed the lesson of Hall and
Moore and adhere to the what the science tells us. In Hall and
Moore, this meant an adherence to the clinical definition, but in
the Montgomery cases we have no “clinical definition” of
irreparable corruption. There are factors for the Court to
consider,379 but no clinical definition per se. What the state courts
have in lieu of a clinical definition, however, is an acknowledgment
by the court that “it is difficult even for expert psychologists to
differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”380
It is bewildering that the Supreme Court would use as a
standard for determining whether a juvenile can be punished to
the harshest penalty available to them a distinction which it knew
to confound even expert psychologists. Justice Scalia rails against
this in his Montgomery dissent, accusing the majority of creating a
de facto constitutional protection against life without parole for all
juveniles because no court would be able to interpret the
irreparable corruption standard.381 Applying the lessons of Atkins,
it seems Scalia was right. Both the protection for intellectually
disabled offenders and for juvenile offenders were fashioned out of
a conception that these cannot be the worst of the worst because of

378. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Consider Legal Standard Drawn
From
‘Of
Mice
and
Men’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
22,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/politics/supreme-court-to-consider-legalstandard-drawn-from-of-mice-and-men.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (reporting
that Texas’s brief in Moore urged the Supreme Court to let judges and juries
decide the standard rather than medical professionals) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
379. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 – 76 (2012) (setting out the
mitigating factors to be considered as “the mitigating qualities of youth”).
380. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
381. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]his whole distortion of Miller[] is just a devious way of eliminating
life without parole for juvenile offenders.”).

SENTENCE FOR THE DAMNED

2205

their diminished culpability.382 In both instances, that diminished
culpability analysis is drawn from developments in psychology and
neuroscience.383 If we apply the Supreme Court’s directive from
Hall and Moore that courts need to adhere to the science, then the
science behind juvenile brain development tells us that experts
cannot make a determination as to whether a juvenile is
irreparably corrupt because their brains are still developing.384 If
the lower courts stick to the science when it comes to juveniles, as
Hall and Moore suggest they should when it comes to the
intellectually disabled, then there should be a requirement for
expert testimony in Montgomery cases. To make a finding that a
juvenile offender is irreparably corrupt, the courts should require
prosecutors to present an expert who can testify that an individual
offender is irreparably corrupt and allow the offenders to present
expert testimony to rebut. The courts should require such
evidence, even if finding credible experts for the prosecution is near
impossible.385 This may be a confounding Catch-22, but it was one
the Court was aware of when it got caught in the crossfire of
federalism and reading adolescent brain science into the Eighth
Amendment.386
382. Compare id. at 726 (clarifying Miller’s requirement that sentencers
consider a child’s diminished culpability and capacity for change), with Atkins,
536 U.S. at 318 (explaining how diminished culpability eliminates the retribution
rationale for the death penalty).
383. Compare Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (drawing the connection to Roper
and Graham’s rationale that children are different), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318
(“[T]here is abundant evidence that [intellectually disabled offenders] often act on
impulse . . . and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.”).
384. See Luna & Wright, supra note 253, at 109 (finding that because of “rapid
change in brain processes during adolescence, who [these children] will become
as adults is not yet clear”).
385. See Brief for the American Psychological Association, American
Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos.
10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239, at *21 (“The predictive power of juvenile
psychotherapy assessments . . . remains poor.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (citing
adolescents developing brains as the rationale which “underlies the rule
forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as having
antisocial personality disorder”).
386. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“If trained psychiatrists with the advantage
of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from
assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver
condemnation . . . .”).
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VI. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s juvenile life without parole cases were a
reaction to the perceptible problem that the United States was
sending too many people to prison for the rest of their lives for
crimes committed as children. The growing numbers of juvenile
lifers flew directly in the face of what developing brain research
and psychology were showing: that kids really are different. The
Court’s concern with the use of the harshest available penalties for
those with diminished culpability had the right idea. But,
unfortunately, in both Atkins and Montgomery, the Court’s
apprehension of overstepping their bounds by interfering with the
states’ administration of their criminal justice systems resulted in
constitutional restrictions that required the states to try and
define amorphous standards. Both the intellectual disability
standard and the irreparable corruption standard draw from
clinical psychology. Yet, by allowing states to define irreparable
corruption, as they did intellectual disability, there is a real danger
that the standard will be not be based on science. Rather, as the
Lennie Standard reveals, they will be based on what the average
Texan or Floridian thinks an irreparably corrupt child should be.
The lesson of Atkins is to avoid this unmooring from the clinical
definitions. The state courts should, thus, require expert testimony
from the states and allow juvenile offenders the opportunity to
present experts of their own when determining irreparable
corruption.

